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DIVIDING SOVEREIGNTY IN TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Zachary S. Price*
In both federal Indian law and the law regarding United States
territories, the Supreme Court in recent decades has shown increasing
skepticism about previously tolerated elements of constitutionally unregu-
lated local governmental authority. This Article proposes a framework
for resolving constitutional questions raised by the Court's recent cases
in these areas. Focusing on the criminal context, where the stakes are
highest both for individual defendants and for the affected communities,
this Article considers three issues: (1) whether and under what circum-
stances Congress may confer criminal jurisdiction on tribal and termto-
rial governments without requiring that those governments' enforcement
decisions be subject to federal executive supervision; (2) whether double
jeopardy should bar successive prosecution by both the federal govern-
ment and a tribal or territorial government exercising federally author-
ized criminal jurisdiction; and (3) what, if any, constitutional proce-
dural protections apply when a tribal or territorial government exercises
criminal juisdiction pursuant to such federal authorization.
Through close examination of these three questions, this Article
aims to show that framing the analysis in terms of divided sovereignty,
and recognizing the close parallels between tribal, territorial, and related
federal-state contexts, may yield the most attractive resolutions that are
viable in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions. This Article con-
trasts this approach with an alternative framework that would organize
the analysis around a distinction between "inherent" and "delegated"
governmental authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Native American reservations and insular territories of the United
States have long been "anomalous zones" of U.S. constitutional law, areas
where usual rules do not apply and the Supreme Court's constitutional
analysis has a distressingly ad hoc character.' In the nineteenth century,
as the United States expanded across the continent and acquired its first
overseas territories, the Supreme Court established that Congress has
"plenary" governmental authority, beyond its usual limited enumerated
powers, with respect to Indian tribes and the territories.2 The Court fur-
ther held that constitutional rights and other limitations on governmen-
tal action apply only incompletely, if at all, to governance of these areas.'
1. The phrase "anomalous zones" is borrowed from Gerald Neuman, who uses it to
refer to "a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embody-
ing fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended." Gerald L.
Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 (1996); see also, e.g., Kal
Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag?: The Evolution of Territoriality in
American Law 5-8, 16, 46-47 (2009) (discussing Indian country and territories as exam-
ples of "intraterritoriality," meaning differentiation between "core where the Constitution
and all laws applied fully" and "periphery where American law applied only partially").
2. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904) (discussing "right of
Congress to make laws for the government of territories"); United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (recognizing "power of the General Government" over Indian
tribes).
3. See, e.g., Dorr, 195 U.S. at 142 (holding Congress's "right ... to make laws for the
government of territories" is not "subject to all the restrictions which are imposed upon
that body when passing laws for the United States, considered as a political body of States
in union"); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the
tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government."); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (indicating
governmental powers of Indian tribes "existed prior to the Constitution" and "are not
operated upon by" constitutional provisions).
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While these rulings served initially to facilitate imperial expansion,4 today
they provide an important foundation for federal statutes and policies
that enable native and territorial communities to govern themselves with
unusual flexibility and autonomy.5 But the Supreme Court seems poised
to upend this framework. Its decisions in recent decades have shown in-
creasing skepticism about the merits of allowing any extraconstitutional
governmental authority within the American polity.'
This Article explores the implications of the shift in the Court's ap-
proach to Indian tribes and territorial governments.' In federal Indian
law, the Court's newfound suspicion of constitutionally unregulated gov-
ernment power has led it both to curtail tribal power over individuals
who are not members of the governing tribe, and to suggest that consti-
4. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 10-15 (2002) (discussing genesis of these cases in context of "[n]ation-
building, expansionist impulses").
5. For a discussion of current tribal and territorial governmental arrangements and
their legal underpinnings, see notes 25-50,94-134, and accompanying text.
6. Scholars have noted this trend in federal Indian law. See, e.g., Frank
Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution 256
(2009) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Broken Landscape] (noting recent cases may "fore-
shadow[] . . . a move to 'constitutionalize' Indian law"); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law
for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over
Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1, 73 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, Common Law] (identifying
"[t] he basic thrust" of recent federal Indian law decisions as impulse "to domesticate tribal
power by harmonizing federal Indian law with basic Anglo-American legal values and as-
sumptions"); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law,
119 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 468 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, Exceptionalism] (identifying in
some Supreme CourtJustices' opinions an "impulse of coherence flowing from the canon-
ical place of the Constitution in our legal culture and the related instinct that all exercises
of governmental power must somehow be subject to it"). Some have contended that the
Court's recent cases reflect a "constitutional crisis" in this area. See, e.g., Frickey,
Exceptionalism, supra, at 464 ("[A] constitutional crisis has emerged in federal Indian
law."); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis
Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 271, 279-85 (2003) (discuss-
ing constitutional crisis caused by recent decisions); Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A
Constitutional Crisis in Indian Law?, 28 Am. Indian L. Rev. 299, 303-05 (2004) (same).
For an argument that the law regarding U.S. territories is also in disarray, see Christina
Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 Colum.
L. Rev. 973, 979-80 (2009) [hereinafter Burnett, Convenient Constitution].
7. In discussing Native Americans and their governments, this Article generally uses
the terms "Indian" and "tribe" because these terms appear most frequently in the federal
legal authorities discussed in this Article. This Article uses the term "territories" (and "ter-
ritorial governments") to refer to the five major "insular" (i.e., overseas) areas subject to
U.S. sovereignty but not included in any state-namely, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. This Article uses the
term advisedly, recognizing that its connotation of plenary federal control is controversial,
particularly with respect to the two commonwealth territories, Puerto Rico and the




tutional due process protections might apply in tribal prosecutions of
such nonmembers.' With respect to territorial governments, the Court
similarly has expressed doubts about the turn-of-the-century doctrine of
the so-called Insular Cases, which permits departures from some constitu-
tional requirements in territories such as Puerto Rico and Guam that the
federal government does not necessarily envision as future states or even
permanent U.S. possessions.' Meanwhile, some recent commentary has
suggested that, at least on putatively originalist premises reflected in
some of the Supreme Court's recent separation of powers decisions, the
entire structure of territorial self-governance is unconstitutional."o
This Article proposes a framework for resolving several constitu-
tional questions raised by the Court's recent cases in these areas. Focus-
ing on the criminal context, where the stakes are highest both for indi-
vidual defendants and for the affected communities, this Article consi-
ders three issues that have been debated in recent judicial opinions and
commentary: (1) whether and under what circumstances Congress may
confer criminal jurisdiction on tribal and territorial governments without
requiring that those governments' enforcement decisions be subject to
federal executive supervision under the Appointments and Take Care
Clauses of the Constitution; (2) whether double jeopardy should bar suc-
cessive prosecution by both the federal government and a tribal or terri-
torial government exercising federally authorized criminal jurisdiction;
and (3) what, if any, constitutional procedural protections apply when a
tribal or territorial government exercises criminal jurisdiction pursuant
to such federal authorization.
The fundamental dilemma presented by each of these questions-
and by the case law regarding Indian tribes and the territories more gen-
8. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
328 (2008) (noting restrictions on "tribal authority over nonmember activities taking place
on the reservation"); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 209 (2004) (upholding stat-
ute restoring tribes' criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians but reserving question
of whether constitutional due process protections apply in such tribal prosecutions); Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (holding tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-
members); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding tribes
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
9. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757-59 (2008) (collecting and
discussing cases establishing this principle but observing "[i]t may well be that over time
the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in
ways that are of constitutional significance"). The Boumediene Court then cites Torres v.
Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979), for the proposition that "[w]hatever the validity of the
[Insular Cases] in the particular historical context in which they were decided, those cases
are clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth Amendment-or
any other provision of the Bill of Rights-to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the
1970's." Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758 (second alteration in Boumediene) (quoting Torres, 442
U.S. at 475-76 (Brennan,J., concurring in the judgment)).
10. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial
Expansion and American Legal History 121-38 (2004) (asserting incongruence between
Constitution and territorial self-governance).
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erally-is one of reconciling the Supreme Court's recently expressed
concerns about extraconstitutional governmental authority with histori-
cal and normative considerations supporting autonomous self-
governance by tribal and territorial communities.
Given the Supreme Court's recognition of plenary congressional au-
thority over territories and Indian tribes," the criminal jurisdiction of
territorial and tribal governments depends on federal authorization, or
at least acquiescence." The Supreme Court's recent decisions in these
areas appear animated in part by a conviction that governmental power
for which the federal government bears some responsibility should be
subject to federal constitutional standards. At the same time, however,
longstanding case law supports allowing tribal and territorial self-
governance. Indeed, although the constitutional text provides only
sparse guidance on this subject, it arguably contemplates congressional
organization of territorial governments," and it acknowledges Indian
tribes as distinct sovereigns within the American polity.'5 Furthermore,
powerful normative and historical considerations support allowing these
communities governmental autonomy. In many cases, the United States
acquired sovereignty over tribes and territories without their consent;16
11. See, e.g., United States v.Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323-24 (2011)
(collecting cases establishing "plenary authority of Congress" over Indian affairs); Lara,
541 U.S. at 200 (same); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 430 & n.26 (1973)
(noting congressional plenary authority over territories).
12. Lara, 541 U.S. at 203 (noting Congress's power to "modify the degree of auton-
omy enjoyed by a dependent sovereign that is not a State").
13. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 327 ("For nearly two centuries now, we
have recognized Indian tribes as 'distinct, independent political communities,' qualified to
exercise many of the powers and prerogatives of self-government." (citations omitted)
(quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832))); Trailer Marine Transp.
Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing how Puerto Rico's
"autonomy increased in stages" and indicating that "[t]oday, the government of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in many respects resembles that of a state").
14. While the Territory Clause grants Congress the "Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States," U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, the Constitution also permits Congress to
admit new states to the Union, id. cl. 1. From the early years of the Republic, Congress
passed organic statutes establishing local governments for territories that would later be
admitted as states. For general discussion of the state admission process, see Eric Biber,
The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States
Entering the Union, 46 Am.J. Legal Hist. 119, 125-29 (2004).
15. The Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation of commerce "with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. art. I,
8, cl. 3.
16. Although some Indian tribes accepted U.S. sovereignty by treaty, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress may exercise its plenary authority over Indian affairs to su-
persede treaty terms with ordinary legislation. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-
66 (1903). For general discussion of the history of federal-tribal relations, see Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law §§ 1.02[3]-.07 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012)
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unlike states, these communities lack direct representation in the federal
government,17 and their histories and traditions may differ markedly
from those of the American polity at large." Courts therefore have tradi-
[hereinafter Cohen]; see also, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 162-67 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, Federal
Supremacy Clause] (discussing forced subjugation of certain tribes during nineteenth
century). As for territories, the Northern Mariana Islands accepted U.S. sovereignty by
entering a "covenant" with the United States, see 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (2006) (Covenant
to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States of America § 101); what is now American Samoa ceded sovereignty to the
United States after an agreement among the United States, Great Britain, and Germany
assigned control of the territory to the United States, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1661-1662; the United
States acquired the former Spanish colonies Puerto Rico and Guam in the treaty
concluding the Spanish-American War, see Treaty of Peace Between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of Spain, U.S.-Spain, art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755;
and the United States purchased what are now the U.S. Virgin Islands from Denmark in
1916, see Convention Between the United States and Denmark for Cession of the Danish
West Indies, Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706. For further discussion of the history of these
territorial acquisitions, see generally Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Law of United States
Territories and Affiliated jurisdictions §§ 3:3-:6 (1995) [hereinafter Laughlin, Territories
and Affiliated Jurisdictions].
17. Although the Supreme Court held in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884), that
Native Americans born into Indian tribes do not hold U.S. citizenship as a matter of con-
stitutional right, Congress has conferred citizenship by statute on all Indians born within
the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006). Native Americans living within the United
States thus are citizens and may vote in state and federal elections, but tribes are not rep-
resented directly in Congress. See generally Cohen, supra note 16, at 922-24, 932-34 (dis-
cussing Indian citizenship and related civil rights). The five major U.S. territories have
nonvoting representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives, 48 U.S.C. §§ 891-894,
1711-1715, 1731-1735, 1751-1757, and individuals born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) hold
U.S. citizenship by statute. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1402, 1406, 1407; 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (Covenant
to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States of America § 303). Individuals born in American Samoa are U.S. nationals
but not citizens unless they have at least one citizen parent. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) (21)-(22),
(29), 1401(e), 1408(1). But see Lisa Maria Perez, Note, Citizenship Denied: The Insular
Cases and the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1029, 1036-42 (2008) (discussing
arguments that Fourteenth Amendment guarantees U.S. citizenship to individuals born in
U.S. territories). U.S. citizens residing in the territories, however, are not represented by
any voting member of Congress, as congressional representation is limited to states; nor
may citizens residing in the territories vote in presidential elections, because the Electoral
College includes only representatives of the states and the District of Columbia. See
Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting argument that
residents of Puerto Rico may vote for congressional representatives); Igartua-de la Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145, 146-47 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting argument that
residents of Puerto Rico have right to vote in presidential elections).
18. See, e.g., Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a
Good Idea-and Constitutional, 27 U. Haw. L. Rev. 331, 335-40 (2005) [hereinafter
Laughlin, Cultural Preservation] (discussing hierarchical elements of American Samoan
culture); Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 799, 838-




tionally given Congress substantial latitude to allow these communities to
govern themselves according to their own preferences and traditions. 9
Viewed in these terms, the questions addressed here present a famil-
iar problem of federalism-the problem of deciding when related ac-
tions by two governments (typically state and federal) should be viewed
as actions of one sovereign or two. Does the federal government's role in
authorizing tribal or territorial criminal jurisdiction mean that resulting
prosecutions are federal action for constitutional purposes? Or should
tribal and territorial self-governance entail the ability to depart from
usual constitutional requirements, notwithstanding the federal govern-
ment's background role in authorizing tribal and territorial jurisdiction?
The key to answering these questions, this Article contends, is rec-
ognizing the federalism problem at the core of the issue. As a practical
matter, tribal and territorial criminal jurisdiction entails a form of di-
vided sovereignty, akin to the more familiar division of federal and state
authority under our constitutional system. When a tribal or territorial
government prosecutes an offense under the tribal or territorial code, it
does so as a functionally independent governmental entity, much like a
state government prosecuting a state offense. But the federal government
also bears some responsibility, as the tribal or territorial government's
jurisdiction depends on federal authorization or acquiescence pursuant
to Congress's plenary authority. Accordingly, in analyzing constitutional
questions, the task is one of dividing up sovereignty-that is, of deciding
to what degree criminal enforcement should be attributed to one level of
government or the other for constitutional purposes. Through close
analysis of the three questions identified above-whether presidential
supervision is required, how double jeopardy applies, and which, if any,
Bill of Rights protections apply in tribal or territorial prosecutions-this
Article aims to show that framing the analysis in terms of divided sover-
eignty, and recognizing the close parallels between tribal, territorial, and
related federal-state contexts, may yield the most attractive resolutions
that are viable in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in these
areas.
This Article contrasts this approach with an alternative framework,
also with some support in case law, that would organize the analysis
around a distinction between "inherent" and "delegated" governmental
authority. 20 According to this alternative view, all constitutional con-
straints normally applicable to the federal government apply if govern-
mental power exercised by a tribal or territorial government is delegated
from Congress. By contrast, if federal legislation instead activates a latent
inherent capacity of the recipient government, then some lesser set of
19. See infra Parts IA.1, I.B.2.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (utilizing this dichotomy).
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constitutional protections, or even no constitutional protections at all,
may be applicable.2'
Though endowed with an alluring conceptual tidiness, this frame-
work encounters a number of problems. First, it treats tribes and territo-
ries quite differently despite the practical similarities between them:
While case law recognizes retained inherent sovereignty for tribes, terri-
torial governments exercise only delegated federal power.22 Second, this
framework suggests that departures from the Bill of Rights in prosecu-
tions by territorial governments are permissible under the Insular Cases
only insofar as the federal government itself can violate those rights, a
result that does not square with current practice and seems normatively
unappealing.23 Third, the framework has difficulty accounting for certain
contexts where state governments exercise delegated federal criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country.24 Despite their basis in a federal delega-
tion, courts have uniformly treated exercises of such jurisdiction as state,
rather than federal, action for constitutional purposes.25 Finally, while
federal recognition that Indian tribes retain an inherent sovereignty that
predates the U.S. constitution is important to many Native Americans
and provides a key underpinning of tribal governmental authority, this
principle has not prevented Congress or the Supreme Court from curtail-
ing tribal jurisdiction in significant ways.26 Developing an alternative
framework, as this Article proposes, may therefore prove important even
for proponents of robust tribal sovereignty.
What specific answers does the divided sovereignty framework yield?
First, on the question of presidential control, the framework supports the
well-established, but newly questioned, practice of allowing a tribe or ter-
ritory to enforce its own substantive criminal law without federal execu-
tive supervision. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has indicated
that enforcement of federal law must be subject to "meaningful
Presidential control."2 But the practical reason for requiring meaningful
presidential control of enforcement in the federal context-ensuring
that a federally accountable official bears responsibility for executive de-
cisions with such significant ramifications for personal liberty-is absent
when a prosecution is a vindication of local values, reflected in locally
enacted law and enforcement by local authorities. Hence, even when
tribal or territorial criminal jurisdiction depends on federal authoriza-
tion or acquiescence, such supervision should not be constitutionally re-
21. For further discussion of this theory and case law supporting it, see infra note 210
and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 145-162 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing judicial and legislative limita-
tions on tribal jurisdiction).
27. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997).
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quired. Tribes and territories, in other words, should enjoy the same au-
tonomy in enforcing their own laws that states do in enforcing theirs.
Second, with respect to double jeopardy, the framework supports
shifting the doctrine's emphasis away from formalistic questions of "sov-
ereignty" and towards consideration of the degree to which prosecutions
reflect autonomous political and moral decisionmaking. The Supreme
Court has held that the double jeopardy prohibition does not bar sepa-
rate prosecution by the federal government following prosecution by a
state or tribe (or by a state or tribe following prosecution by the federal
government) because states and tribes are "separate sovereigns" from the
federal government.28 Early in America's overseas imperial adventure,
however, the Court held that territorial prosecutions do bar federal re-
prosecution because territorial governments derive their power entirely
from Congress and thus hold no "separate sovereignty."' As the First
Circuit has recognized in the context of Puerto Rico, this doctrine no
longer reflects the practical reality of territorial government."o In effect,
territorial governments today are local authorities that vindicate local
values with much the same degree of practical independence from the
federal government as a state or tribe. The First Circuit's approach there-
fore is correct and should be expanded to cover additional territorial
governments.
Finally, on the question of whether particular individual rights apply
in tribal or territorial criminal prosecutions, the framework supports an
analysis focused on cultural accommodation. The skepticism about con-
stitutionally unregulated governmental authority that animates the
Supreme Court's recent cases suggests that the Court will view individual
rights as at least presumptively applicable in tribal and territorial pro-
ceedings that depend on federal authorizing legislation. Nevertheless,
recognizing the interplay of sovereignty at work in tribal and territorial
prosecutions might support accommodating, at least to some degree,
tribal or territorial procedural traditions that depart from the precise
guarantees of the Bill of Rights as applied in federal prosecutions. As de-
scribed in greater detail below, one approach to doing so might deter-
mine the applicability of particular rights based on the relative strength
of individual and community interests, seeking in particular to avoid pro-
cedural disparities that appear likely to systematically skew case outcomes
or alter the fundamental fairness of proceedings in tribal or territorial
28. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978) (holding tribes
are "separate sovereigns" from federal government for double jeopardy purposes); Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1959) (holding state and federal government may
separately punish offender for same offense as separate "sovereigns").
29. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987)




courts as opposed to federal courts.31 This Article identifies support for
such an approach in prior cases from tribal and territorial contexts, as
well as in cases addressing analogous problems of federal-state rela-
tions.3
It should be emphasized that the goals of the analysis in this Article
are doctrinal and practical. This Article does not seek to remake the doc-
trine from the ground up. Its objective, rather, is to explore a path that
might give force to the concerns about extraconstitutional governance
that animate the Supreme Court's recent cases, while also acknowledging
practical realities and the compelling historical and normative basis for
autonomous self-governance by tribal and territorial communities. Ac-
cordingly, although the Court's recent decisions on these topics have
received a chilly reception from many scholars,33 the analysis presented
here accepts those decisions as established features of the legal terrain
that need to be accounted for in any descriptively adequate doctrinal
theory. By the same token, this Article tables questions regarding the va-
lidity of congressional "plenary" power over territories and Indian tribes,
though scholars have offered powerful criticisms of the plenary power
doctrine.34 Finally, while some may question whether, given the troubled
history of federal relations with tribal and territorial communities, it is
31. See infra notes 280-287, 322-327 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 263-272 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Pommersheim, Broken Landscape, supra note 6, at 297 (describing
"pattern of doctrinal confusion" in federal Indian law cases); Burnett, Convenient
Constitution, supra note 6, at 974-76 (objecting to Boumediene's framework for analyzing
questions regarding extraterritorial application of Constitution); Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121, 128-29 (2006) (argu-
ing Supreme Court decisions have led to "unwelcome results for the federal government,
Indians, Indian tribes, states, and non-Indians"); Frickey, Exceptionalism, supra note 6, at
436 (faulting Supreme Court for "engag[ing] in aggressive institutional and doctrinal
revisionism, essentially displacing Congress as the federal agent with front-line responsibil-
ity for federal Indian policy"); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The
New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1573, 1574 (1996)
(criticizing Supreme Court for "abandoning entrenched principles of Indian law in favor
of an approach that bends tribal sovereignty to fit the Court's perceptions of non-Indian
interests"); Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a "Constitution [That] Follows the
Flag ... But Doesn't Quite Catch Up With It": From Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v. Bush,
80 Miss. L.J. 181, 182 (2010) (faulting Supreme Court for reaffirming Insular Cases in
Boumediene, because "the Court's interpretation of the Territorial Clause constitutionally
'inconveniences' the territorial citizens by relegating them to second-class legal status").
34. See, e.g., Pommersheim, Broken Landscape, supra note 6, at 125 (characterizing
"doctrine of plenary power" as "inaugurat[ing] extraconstitutional regime within the field
of Indian law"); Cleveland, supra note 4, at 14 (characterizing plenary power doctrine with
respect to both Indians and territories as incapable of justification "by mainstream forms
of constitutional analysis" and rooted "in a peculiarly unattractive, late-nineteenth-century
nationalist and racist view of American society and federal power"); Clinton, Federal
Supremacy Clause, supra note 16, at 163 ("The legislative Indian plenary power doctrine
was not a reasoned analysis derived from the text, history, or purposes of the United States
Constitution. Rather, it constituted an unprincipled assertion of raw federal authority
based on nothing more than the naked power to effectuate it.").
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appropriate to address these communities' potential autonomy through
a framework of federal law at all, this Article brackets questions of ulti-
mate legitimacy and instead analyzes these questions from the perspec-
tive of a federal decisionmaker bound to apply federal law and to seek co-
herent solutions within the existing legal system.35
Other scholars have proposed various frameworks, including some
based on federalism, for understanding the status of tribal and territorial
governments. 36 Some scholars have considered doctrinal questions ad-
dressed here.3 ' Few, however, have attempted an intensive analysis of spe-
cific constitutional questions based on parallel consideration of tribal,
35. For a similar approach, see Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts:
Applying the Myths and Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts' Criminal
Jurisdiction, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 77, 91 (2004) (noting article is written "from the perspective
of federal lawmakers, asking questions about what stance national law ought to take to-
wards [tribes]").
36. For a small sampling of such proposals, see, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship 87-93,
130-32 (2002) (arguing Congress could confer increased autonomy on territories and
Constitution protects tribal self-government); Jose Trias Monge, Injustice According to
Law: The Insular Cases and Other Oddities, in Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico,
American Expansion, and the Constitution 226, 234-37 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke
Marshall eds., 2001) (arguing territories could be granted greater self-determination);
Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation,
72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797, 876 (2005) [hereinafter Burnett, Untied States] (advocating "de-
annexationist interpretation of the doctrine of territorial incorporation" that would
"preserv[e] the option of separation for any territory subject to U.S. sovereignty and fed-
eral law but denied equal representation through statehood"); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative
of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 Or. L.
Rev. 1109, 1195-98 (2004) (advocating "experiential sovereignty" for Indian tribes that
links legal and cultural sovereignty); Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian
Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism
and Republican Democracy, 25 U. Tol. L. Rev. 617, 618-19 (1994) (advocating federalist
framework in which tribes are placed on same "plane" as states vis-i-vis federal govern-
ment); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 198 (1984) (advocating constitutional limitations on
laws affecting tribal sovereignty and property rights); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal
Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069, 1107-10 (2004) (concluding "federal government
lacks a plenary, nationwide 'Indian power"' and arguing each tribe's relationship with
federal government should be considered individually); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining
the Status of Indian Tribes Within "Our Federalism": Beyond the Dependency Paradigm,
38 Conn. L. Rev. 667, 669 (2006) (arguing Congress could "constitutionally incorporate
tribes under a third sphere of sovereignty"); Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism
Based upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 318, 320
(2003) (proposing "constitutional trifederalism" in which Indian tribes are recognized as
domestic sovereigns).
37. See, e.g., Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 6, at 1004-08 (discussing
case law on jury rights in territorial context); Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara,
Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47, 62-70 (2004) [here-
inafter Skibine, Dialectic of Incorporation] (discussing whether due process requires tribal
courts to afford defendants all Bill of Rights protections).
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territorial, and state contexts, despite the important insights such a com-
parative perspective may afford.' The questions addressed here, more-
over, may well be litigated soon, and their answers have immediate
significance for the millions of people who live in tribal and territorial
communities, some of which face severe law and order problems.39 They
have particular salience in the tribal context in light of recent legislation
authorizing, for the first time in thirty-five years, tribal court criminal
jurisdiction over certain individuals who are not members of any Indian
tribe." In addition, as this Article will show in the course of its analysis,
consideration of the issues analyzed here illuminates constitutional ques-
tions of broader significance. In particular, the analysis here may shed
light on the proper application of the Appointments, Take Care, and
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution in the more familiar
federal-state context.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I is a brief survey of the legal
landscape, summarizing the law with respect to criminal jurisdiction of
Indian tribes and territorial governments. It also addresses the law re-
garding two analogous state contexts where state criminal jurisdiction
depends on federal authorization: congressional relaxation of dormant
Commerce Clause restrictions on state commercial regulation, and fed-
eral delegation of certain elements of federal criminal jurisdiction to
states in Indian country. Part II analyzes the three doctrinal questions
presented above: the necessity of federal executive control, the
applicability of double jeopardy, and the enforceability of constitutional
38. But see, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 85-87, 115-19 (discussing case law
modifying constitutional requirements for territories "in response to cultural diversity"
and case law addressing criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes); Skibine, Dialectic of
Incorporation, supra note 37, at 66 (applying Insular Cases framework to tribes and con-
cluding Constitution applies fully to tribes only if they have been "incorporated" into the
United States).
39. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a), 124
Stat. 2258, 2262-63 (reporting congressional findings that thirty-four percent of American
Indian and Alaska Native women will be raped in their lifetimes and that increased meth-
amphetamine use on reservations has led to increased domestic violence, burglary, assault,
and child abuse); Report by the President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status 64-65
(2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/PuertoRico_Task_
Force Report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Puerto Rico's "alarmingly
high" murder rate and "vulnerab[ility] to transnational crime"); Angela R. Riley, Indians
and Guns, 100 Geo. L.J. 1675, 1733-34 (2012) (discussing "evidence suggesting high crime
rates in Indian country"); Kevin IL Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 779, 786 (2006) (hereinafter Washburn, Tribal Self-
Determination] ("For decades, crime rates involving Indians have been higher than any
other racial or ethnic group in the United States."); Daniel Shea, Homicides in V.I., V.I.
Daily News (Jan. 13, 2011), http://virginislandsdailynews.com/newshomicides-in-v-i-
1.1089794 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting 2010 murder rate in U.S.
Virgin Islands rendered territory "the most violent place in the United States, on a per-
capita basis," with murder rate second only to Honduras globally).
40. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 113-
4, tit. IX, § 904.
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procedural guarantees. Part III concludes by returning to the broader
themes and implications of the analysis. It suggests that the approach
proposed in this Article not only resolves open questions in federal
Indian law and the law regarding U.S. territories, but also helps clarify
other areas of constitutional law.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
This Part will offer a brief summary of existing law governing the
criminal jurisdiction of tribal and territorial governments, as well as
analogous state contexts where criminal jurisdiction depends on federal
authorization. Certain features of this legal landscape, such as congres-
sional plenary authority over Indian country and the territories, appear
well entrenched. But the Supreme Court's recent cases have introduced
uncertainty by displaying discomfort with previously accepted elements
of extraconstitutional authority in tribal and territorial governance.
A. Indian Tribes
Native American relations with the United States have a tragic his-
tory. Congress has, at various times, pursued policies aimed at the assimi-
lation of tribal members and extinction of tribal cultural and political
independence, to say nothing of historic efforts to expel or exterminate
native peoples altogether.' Today, however, both political branches are
committed, at least in principle, to supporting the sovereignty of Indian
tribes as independent governmental entities12 As a result, "American
Indian nations are now exercising more sovereignty on the ground than
at any point since the early nineteenth century."" Yet this tribal
revitalization has caused new controversies. In part because of past
federal policies-particularly the turn-of-the-century policy of
"allotment" that effectively opened up many Indian lands to non-Indian
settlement"-Indian reservations today often include substantial
41, For summary accounts of the history of federal policy toward Indian tribes, see
generally Cohen, supra note 16, at 3-108 (providing chapter "History & Background of
Federal Indian Policy"); Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination, supra note 39, at 790-831
(focusing on criminal justice).
42. See generally Fletcher, supra note 33, at 141-54 (2006) (demonstrating federal
policy of both Congress and executive branch since 1970s to support tribal self-
determination).
43. Sarah Krakoff, The Renaissance of Tribal Sovereignty, the Negative Doctrinal
Feedback Loop, and the Rise of a New Exceptionalism, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 47, 48 (2005)
(citing Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (2005)).
44. The allotment policy involved forcible division of communal Indian lands into
individual freeholds, which in many cases ended up in non-Indian hands as a result of
sales or tax foreclosures. For general accounts of this period in federal Indian policy, see,
e.g., Cohen, supra note 16, at 71-79; Pommersheim, Broken Landscape, supra note 6, at
126-37; Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 7-18 (1995).
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populations of individuals who are not members of the tribe and
therefore cannot vote in tribal elections.15 As tribes have sought to
revitalize their sovereignty, courts have struggled to define the proper
bounds of tribal governmental authority, particularly with respect to
nonmember populations within reservation boundaries.
1. "Domestic Dependent Nations. "- The sparse guidance the Constitu-
tion itself provides on the status of America's native peoples seems to
place Indian tribes in an intermediate category between foreign and do-
mestic states. The Constitution originally excluded "Indians not taxed"
from the apportionment of direct taxes and (as in the later Fourteenth
Amendment) congressional seats, thus arguably signaling Indians' status
as separate from the polity." The Commerce Clause-which includes the
Constitution's only other express reference to Native Americans-pro-
vides for congressional regulation of "Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."47 This listing
seems to characterize tribes as distinct from both U.S. and foreign states.
Early in the nation's history, the Marshall Court coined the peculiar
phrase "domestic dependent nations" to characterize native communi-
ties' hybrid position.' Indian tribes, according to this understanding, are
sovereign in their domain, and, like foreign states, are to interact prin-
cipally with the federal government and not the states.49 At the same
time, Indian tribes are "dependent," lacking the capacity for external for-
eign relations and subject to unusually broad federal authority as
"ward[s]" of the national government. 5
Over the course of many vicissitudes in congressional policy and case
law, full recounting of which is beyond the scope of this Article, the
Supreme Court has continued to view Indian tribes as a sort of constitu-
tional hybrid, resembling states in certain respects and foreign nations in
45. See Frickey, Common Law, supra note 6, at 15 ("Because of allotment, many
reservations today have a significant non-Indian population and a checkerboard land pat-
tern with non-Indian fee property mixed in with Indian allotments and collective tribal
property.").
46. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
47. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
48. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
49. See id. (describing Indians as "hav[ing] an unquestionable, and, heretofore, un-
questioned right to the lands they occupy" but also as being "completely under the sover-
eignty and dominion of the United States"); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 556-57 (1832) (noting congressional enactments "regulat[ing] trade and intercourse
with the Indians" while also describing tribes as "distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries within which their authority is exclusive"). See generally Frickey,
Exceptionalism, supra note 6, at 438-39 (describing Worcester).
50. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552
("The Cherokees acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States,




others.5 ' On the one hand, the Supreme Court has characterized tribes
as retaining "inherent" sovereign authority except insofar as the federal
government has explicitly or implicitly abrogated such sovereignty. In a
recent formulation, "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sover-
eignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary
result of their dependent status."5 2 On the other hand, tribes are gener-
ally subject to "plenary" congressional authority.53 The Court initially de-
scribed this plenary authority as "inherent" in the federal government's
sovereignty, but today courts tend to locate the source of this authority
(rather awkwardly) in the express textual grant of the Indian Commerce
Clause.54 Under the plenary power doctrine, Congress is not limited to its
enumerated powers in legislating for Indian tribes. It instead acts as a
sort of super-legislature with authority to expand or contract tribal juris-
diction and uphold or override tribal laws and governmental structures.
Congress's actions may be constrained either by fiduciary obligations to
the federal government's Indian "wards"" or by due process or other
constitutional limitations.5 7 But judicial review of federal legislation
regarding Indian tribes is unusually lax.58
51. For an account of the evolution of the Supreme Court's views on tribal sovereign-
ty and the development of the plenary power doctrine, see Cleveland, supra note 4, at 25-
81. As a rough generalization, the Marshall Court was relatively protective of tribal sove-
reignty, the Court later in the nineteenth century granted virtually unlimited power to
Congress, and the Court later in the twentieth century restored some limitations on
Congress's plenary power. See Pommersheim, Broken Landscape, supra note 6, at 112-15;
Cleveland, supra note 4, at 35-63.
52. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
53. See, e.g., United States v.Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323-24 (2011)
(listing cases demonstrating tribes' "sovereign function [is] subject to the plenary author-
ity of Congress").
54. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (identifying authority
within Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490
U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("[T]he central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to pro-
vide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.").
55. Lara, 541 U.S. at 203 (noting Congress's power to "modify the degree of auton-
omy enjoyed by a dependent sovereign that is not a State").
56. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
57. See, e.g., ficarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2324 (noting "'the undisputed exist-
ence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people"'
and discussing statutes establishing fiduciary relationship between United States and tribes
(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983))); United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935) (noting federal government's authority over Indian
property is "not absolute," but rather "subject to limitations inhering in such a guardian-
ship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions").
58. The Supreme Court indicated early in the twentieth century that federal policy
toward Indian tribes was a political question subject to no judicial scrutiny. See Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the
Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always
been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of
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Under this governing framework, tribal officials, as authorities of a
government with independent inherent sovereignty, have been free to
define and prosecute crimes within jurisdictional confines explicitly or
implicitly set by Congress. One important implication of tribes' residual
sovereignty, moreover, is that tribal prosecutions for such tribal offenses
do not bar separate federal or state prosecution before or after a tribal
prosecution, even for an identical offense.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies
to states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,'
provides that no "person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' But the Supreme Court has long
held that prosecutions by "separate sovereigns" do not constitute the
same offense for purposes of this provision."1 On this theory, states and
the federal government are considered separate sovereigns with separate
authority to prosecute defendants for otherwise identical offenses;
"[e]ach has the power, inherent in any sovereign, independently to deter-
mine what shall be an offense against its authority and to punish such
offenses, and in doing so each 'is exercising its own sovereignty, not that
of the other.""' Extending the same logic to tribes, the Court has held
that Indian nations retain a residual separate sovereignty that renders
their criminal prohibitions distinct from federal or state offenses.63
As a further implication of tribes' inherent sovereignty, the Supreme
Court has held that tribes are not restrained by the Bill of Rights or
Fourteenth Amendment. In the landmark 1896 case of Talton v. Mayes,
the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of grand
jury indictment has for its "sole object to control the powers conferred by
the Constitution on the National Government" and thus does not apply
to Indian tribes, whose "powers of local self government ... existed prior
to the Constitution."' The Court intimated cryptically that Indian tribes'
"powers of local self government are also operated upon and restrained
the government."). Although the Court has abandoned that view, it has developed unique
standards for review of legislation on key issues. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415-17 (1980) (finding taking of Indian land necessitates just com-
pensation under Takings Clause only if Congress failed to provide offsetting benefits such
that trustee in good faith could have concluded transaction benefited tribe); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-55 (1974) (upholding legislation that singles out members of
Indian tribes for special treatment and rejecting view that such legislation constitutes ra-
cial discrimination subject to strict scrutiny).
59. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787
(1969).
60. U.S. Const. amend. V.
61. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 194-95 (1959).
62. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
63. Id. at 328.
64. 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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by the general provisions of the Constitution of the United States."'a But
the Court has since characterized Talton as establishing that "the Bill of
Rights in the Federal Constitution does not apply to Indian tribal gov-
ernments."'
Today, most criminal procedure requirements of the Bill of Rights
nevertheless apply to tribes by statute. Exercising its plenary authority
over Indian affairs, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
in 1968.7 This statute requires tribes to abide by criminal procedure re-
quirements of the Bill of Rights, with a few notable exceptions.6 First,
tribes do not need to provide grand jury indictments.' Second, neither
are tribes required to provide appointed counsel, except in certain pros-
ecutions authorized by two recent statutes described below." Third, alt-
hough the statute requires trial by jury of at least six members in all cases
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment, it does not expressly
require unanimous jury verdicts,7 though such unanimity would be re-
quired for conviction by any six-member jury in federal or state court.72
Fourth, ICRA, unlike the Sixth Amendment, generally does not require
an "impartial jury." In the Sixth Amendment context, the Supreme Court
has inferred from this term a "fair cross section" requirement that bars
federal and state governments from systematically excluding any "dis-
tinct" group within the community from jury venires." Tribes, in con-
65. Id.
66. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 n.3 (1978).
67. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (1968) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 1301-1303).
68. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. V 2012).
69. See id.
70. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
71. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
72. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979) (holding six-member juries
must be unanimous); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (finding Sixth
Amendment requires at least six members on jury); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,411
(1972) (holding nonunanimous 9-3 or 10-2 verdicts permissible for states but not federal
government); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1972) (same); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (finding six-member jury permissible). The right to a jury
trial under ICRA is broader than the federal constitutional right in that it applies to any
offense punishable by imprisonment; the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require jury
trial only for offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than six months. See,
e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970) (identifying six-month line).
73. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1387 (2010) ("The Sixth
Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury
drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community."); Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) ("Without that requirement, the State could draw up jury lists in
such manner as to produce a pool of prospective jurors disproportionately ill disposed
towards one or all classes of defendants . . . ."); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64
(1979) ("In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement,
the defendant must show .. . that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group
in the community. . . ."),
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trast, have often limited jury service to tribal members or, at least, mem-
bers of some Indian tribe.74 Finally, even as to the constitutional rights
that ICRA does incorporate, courts have held that the statute does not
necessarily impose precisely the same requirements as the U.S.
Constitution; the statute, rather, permits variations to account for tribal
traditions and circumstances.7 5 For example, some tribal courts have ap-
plied culturally specific notions of the reasonableness of searches and the
adequacy of confrontation rights.76
ICRA generally limits tribes to penalties not exceeding one year's
imprisonment or a $5,000 fine.77 In addition, as a result of case law de-
scribed below, tribes generally may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians-i.e., individuals who are not members of any Indian tribe.
Two recent statutes relax these limitations but only if tribes abide by ad-
ditional due process requirements.
First, in the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), Congress
amended ICRA to permit tribes to impose penalties of up to three years
for a single offense and nine years total as a cumulative penalty for mul-
tiple offenses.79 To exercise this jurisdiction, however, tribes must pro-
vide additional due process protections, including the right to appointed
counsel.ao The TLOA, however, does not require grand jury indictment,
74. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 & n.4 (1978);
see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (lacking prohibition against all-Indian juries). For discussion
of a new statute amending ICRA to require an impartial jury in certain prosecutions of
non-Indians, see infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (describing
lower court decision as "recognizing that standards of analysis developed under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause were not necessarily controlling in the
interpretation of [ICRA]"); Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th
Cir. 1988) (balancing individual and tribal interests "[w]here tribal court procedures un-
der scrutiny differ significantly from those 'commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon society"'
(quoting Howlett v. Salish Tribe, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976))); Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Marchand, 33 I.L.R. 6036, 6037 (Confederated Tribes of Colville
Reservation Tribal Ct. 2006) (declining to following Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause case law except to extent consistent with "our history"). See gener-
ally Mark D. Rosen, Evaluating Tribal Courts' Interpretations of the Indian Civil Rights
Act, in The Indian Civil Rights Act at Forty 275, 275-324 (Kristen A. Carpenter et al. eds.,
2012) [hereinafter Rosen, Evaluating] (including survey of tribal court applications of
ICRA); Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at
Thirty Years, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 465 (1998) (same).
76. See infra notes 328-331 and accompanying text (discussing tribal court decisions
reaching such conclusions).
77. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (7) (B). As originally passed in 1968, ICRA limited tribes to
imposing six-month sentences and fines of $500. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, § 202, 82 Stat.
73. 77 (1968). A 1986 amendment adopted these higher limits. Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. IV,
§ 4217, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-146 (1986).
78. See infra Part I.A.2.
79. Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, § 234(a), 124 Stat. 2258, 2279-80 (2010) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a), (b)).
80. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c).
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trial before a jury including nonmembers of the tribe, or, more gener-
ally, interpretation of ICRA's due process guarantees in a manner identi-
cal to corresponding constitutional requirements.
The second recent statute is the Violence Against Women Reauthor-
ization Act of 2013 (VAWA) ,' which "recognized and affirmed" tribes'
"inherent power" to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all persons, in-
cluding non-Indians, who commit certain domestic violence offenses
against an Indian victim and bear certain connections to the tribe. To
exercise this jurisdiction, tribes must provide not only the TLOA's ex-
panded set of procedural protections, but also "the right to a trial by an
impartial jury that is drawn from sources that-(A) reflect a fair cross
section of the community; and (B) do not systematically exclude any dis-
tinctive group in the community, including non-Indians." 3 In addition,
tribes exercising this "special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction"
under VAWA must provide "all other rights whose protection is necessary
under the Constitution of the United States" in order for the grant of
jurisdiction to be constitutional.84
The exclusive remedy for tribal violations of ICRA, including its pro-
cedural requirements, is federal habeas corpus review "to test the legality
of [an individual's] detention by order of an Indian tribe"; there is no
direct review of tribal convictions in federal or state court.85
2. The Constitution Comes to Indian Country. - In recent decades, the
Supreme Court has injected new uncertainty into this doctrinal structure
by exhibiting discomfort with tribes' ability to exercise extraconstitu-
tional governmental powers. The Court has expressed particular con-
cerns about tribal authority over individuals who are not tribal members
and thus are not represented in tribal institutions, including, in many
cases, tribal juries.86 Following the path of least resistance in the frame-
work of prior case law, however, the Court has manifested its discontent
81. Pub. L. No. 113-4 (to be codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s47enr/pdf/BILLS-113s47enr.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
82. Id. § 904 (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1)). The tribal jurisdiction provi-
sion of this legislation was based on a proposal from the Obama Administration. See M.
Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant, Lara, and DOJ's
Proposed Fix, 28 Harv.J. on Racial & Ethnic Just. 117, 119 (2012) (arguing proposed legis-
lation is legally permissible under Oliphant and Lara); Press Release, Office of the Assoc.
Att'y Gen., Department of Justice Proposes Legislation To Help Tribes Combat Violence
Against Native Women in Indian Country (July 21, 2011), available at
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-asg 955.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(explaining need for legislation).
83. VAWA § 904 (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3)).
84. Id. (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (4)).
85. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (providing habeas corpus); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69-70 (1978) (deeming habeas remedy exclusive).
86. For a collection of articles noting this trend, see supra note 6.
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not by altering the characterization of tribal authority as extraconstitu-
tional but rather by curtailing tribes' authority to exercise jurisdiction
over nonmembers in the first place.
A trilogy of cases, stretching from 1978 to 2004, has addressed tribal
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.17 The first case in this line,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, held that tribes lacked criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians." Though conceding that governing statutes
did not squarely resolve the issue," the Court concluded that the "com-
monly shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower
federal courts," to which the Court gave "considerable weight," was "that
tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians."' The Court,
however, ultimately rested its holding on an intuition of "inherent limita-
tions on tribal powers that stem from their incorporation into the United
States," even without congressional legislation expressly imposing such
limits.9 "[F] rom the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill
of Rights," the Court asserted, "the United States has manifested ...
great solicitude that its citizens be protected by the United States from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."92 The Court thus
found that an exercise of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians "would belie the tribes' forfeiture of full sovereignty in return for
the protection of the United States," though it also left open the possibil-
ity that Congress might itself "decid[e] whether Indian tribes should fi-
nally be authorized to try non-Indians."93
87. A separate body of case law, almost uniformly hostile to tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, has addressed tribal civil regulatory authority in the absence of an express
congressional grant ofjurisdiction. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land
& Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008) (rejecting tribal authority to regulate sale of fee
land on reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) ("(E]xercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control inter-
nal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive
without express congressional delegation."). For a recent critical discussion of the civil and
criminal cases in parallel, see Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and
Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 48 (2010) (characterizing
cases as reflecting emergence of "new paradigm" of tribal sovereignty).
88. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
89. ICRA, for example, simply regulated tribal jurisdiction over any "persons." 25
U.S.C. § 1302.
90. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206. For critical appraisal of Oliphants historical analysis, see,
e.g., Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 Wash.
L. Rev. 479, 492-99 (1979) (describing legal and judicial precedents relied upon by
Oliphant Court as "thin" and often inapposite); Samuel E. Ennis, Note, Reaffirming Indian
Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory
Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 553, 593-97 (2009) (contending "Oliphant Court
relied entirely on materials that were either outdated or lacked authority to begin with" in
order to conclude tribes had been divested of criminal jurisdiction).
91. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
92. Id. at 210.
93. Id. at 211-12.
676 [Vol. 113:657
DIVIDING SOVEREIGNTY
In Duro v. Reina, the Court carried Oliphant a step further and held
that tribes' submission to "the overriding sovereignty of the United
States" divested them of criminal jurisdiction not only over non-Indians
but also over nonmembers-that is, Indians who are not members of the
particular prosecuting tribe.9 4 As in Oliphant, the Court in Duro empha-
sized the limited character of tribal sovereignty.A But it also placed even
greater emphasis than in Oliphant on due process implications of tribal
jurisdiction.
The Court, for example, "hesitate [d] to adopt a view of tribal sover-
eignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmember
Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include them."' Citing
Reid v. Covert-a fractured decision, discussed further below,
97 that re-
jected the use of military courts to try capital offenses by civilian depend-
ents of overseas service personnel 9 -the Court asserted that "[o] ur cases
suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to sub-
ject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that
does not provide constitutional protections as a matter of right."' In the
Court's view, the jurisdiction of tribal courts even over members of the
tribe was explicable only on a theory of consent. In other words, such
jurisdiction was permissible only because of the "voluntary character of
tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation in a tribal
government."' "
Congress swiftly overturned Duro. In legislation known as the "Duro
fix,"'o Congress "recognized and affirmed" "the inherent power of
Indian tribes ... to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians." 0 In
the final case in the Oliphant trilogy, United States v. Lara, the Supreme
Court upheld the Duro fix. 03 Congress's plenary power over Indian af-
fairs, the Court reasoned, includes "the constitutional power to relax re-
strictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on the exer-
cise of a tribe's inherent legal authority." 04
94. 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
95. See id. at 685-86 (observing "tribes can no longer be considered as sovereigns"
with "power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's territory" and
concluding "retained sovereignty of the tribes is that needed to control their own internal
relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social order").
96. Id. at 693.
97. See infra notes 164-171 and accompanying text.
98. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1957) (plurality opinion).
99. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
100. Id. at 694.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (using term "Duro fix").
102. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
103. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
104. Id. at 196, 200-07.
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At the same time, the Court in Lara avoided difficult questions about
the constitutional implications of the Duro fix. The immediate issue in
Lara was a double jeopardy question.'05 The defendant, who had been
prosecuted in tribal court, was being reprosecuted for an identical crime
in federal court.' The Court in Lara concluded that Congress's action
was effective in reactivating an inherent authority of the tribe to prose-
cute nonmember Indians;o'0 accordingly, a majority held that the tribe
was a "separate sovereign" for double jeopardy purposes, notwithstand-
ing the dependence of tribal jurisdiction on Congress's statutory repudi-
ation of Duro.ios The Court reserved, however, the question of whether
"the Due Process Clause forbids Congress to permit a tribe to prosecute a
nonmember Indian citizen of the United States in a forum" that "lacks
certain constitutional protections for criminal defendants, in particular
the right of an indigent defendant to counsel."'"
Separate opinions by individual justices in Lara raised broader con-
stitutional issues. First, Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opin-
ion in Duro, remained steadfast in his view that tribal membership pro-
vides the exclusive basis for tribes' extraconstitutional authority to im-
pose criminal punishment. Though accepting the Court's conclusion on
the double jeopardy question, he suggested that Congress's authorization
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers was plainly unconstitu-
tional because it subjected a citizen, "within our domestic borders, to a
sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution." 0
Second, in an opinion calling for a general rethinking of federal
Indian law, Justice Thomas accepted for purposes of the case the political
branches' "authoritative pronouncement[]" that tribal prosecution of
nonmember Indians was consistent with tribes' retained sovereignty."'
But he emphasized that if tribal criminal jurisdiction instead resulted
from a delegation of federal power, then its exercise would constitute
federal executive power, which Congress (he asserted) "cannot transfer
... to individuals who are beyond 'meaningful Presidential control."'l 2
Finally, a dissent by Justice Souter (joined by Justice Scalia) characterized
the delegation of federal legislative authority as the only possible basis for
an expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction. The dissent thus concluded,
without addressing due process or separation of powers, that double
jeopardy barred the defendant's federal prosecution." 3
105. Id. at 197.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 199-200.
108. Id. at 207, 210.
109. Id. at 207-09.
110. Id. at 212 (KennedyJ., concurring).
111. Id. at 222-23 (ThornasJ., concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. at 216 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997)).
113. Id. at 230-31 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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Oliphant, Duro, and Lara have opened up profound uncertainties re-
garding the extent and permissibility of tribes' previously settled author-
ity to prosecute offenses against tribal law without following procedural
requirements of the Constitution that would apply in federal or state
court. Although scholars and tribal advocates have severely criticized
these decisions for curtailing tribal authority and calling into question
the extraconstitutional character of tribal sovereignty,"' this trilogy of
cases provides the framework within which other courts and governmen-
tal actors will need to resolve questions such as those concerning the
need for federal executive control of tribal criminal enforcement and the
applicability of Bill of Rights guarantees in tribal prosecutions.
Those questions may well arise with greater urgency soon. For the
first time since Oliphant, VAWA, as noted, authorizes tribal criminal ju-
risdiction over certain non-Indians."' As tribes--some of which currently
face grave problems of law and order" 6 -seek to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred by this partial "Oliphant fix," as well as the expanded sentenc-
ing authority under the 2010 TLOA,"' litigation presenting such ques-
tions will likely arise more frequently, and with higher stakes.
B. Territories
Territories, in stark contrast to Indian tribes, have no inherent au-
thority under the Constitution. Nonetheless, the case law places territo-
ries in a remarkably similar position to tribes.118 Territories, like Indian
tribes, are subject to "plenary" congressional authority, even though un-
der governing statutes territorial governments exercise substantial au-
tonomous power. In particular, territorial governments may prosecute
offenders without providing the same procedural guarantees applicable
in federal prosecutions. Here, too, however, the Supreme Court has
called into question this constitutional exceptionalism. The Court has
suggested in recent decisions that the doctrine of the Insular Cases that
114. See, e.g., Frickey, Exceptionalism, supra note 6, at 457-70 (highlighting disre-
gard for congressional plenary power and judicial deference in these cases); Getches,
supra note 33, at 1575 (criticizing Court for "arrogat[ing] to itself the role of reviewing
and weighing non-Indian interests and, ultimately, of redesigning the sovereignty of
Indian tribes"); Ennis, supra note 90, at 556 (arguing legislative abrogation of Oliphant is
needed "to improve reservation safety and restore territorial sovereignty to Indian tribes").
115. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 39 (noting recent reports of high crime rates in tribal regions
and territories).
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Supp. V 2012); see also supra notes 79-80 and accom-
panying text (describing TLOA's expansion of penal authority).
118. Kal Raustiala uses the apt term "intraterritoriality" to describe these twin exam-
ples of unusually unrestrained congressional authority over areas considered quasi-foreign
but under U.S. sovereign control. Raustiala, supra note 1, at 16.
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permits such extraconstitutional governance may no longer be applica-
ble to the United States' most significant territories.119
1. "Foreign in a Domestic Sense. "- As a formal constitutional matter,
all governmental power in the territories is federal in character and de-
rives, directly or indirectly, from a delegation from Congress. 0 Although
the source, nature, and extent of Congress's authority over territorial
communities may have been unclear in the early years of the Republic,' 2 1
the Supreme Court has settled on the view that the Territory Clause of
the Constitution, which gives Congress the "Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States,"'22 gives Congress "plenary
authority" over governance of areas subject to U.S. sovereignty but not
included in the bounds of any state or the District of Columbia. 23
Congress thus retains formal authority to "revise, alter, or revoke" any
governmental arrangement established for the territories, 24 even if it
appears unlikely today that Congress will revise such governing arrange-
ments in a manner fundamentally contrary to territorial wishes. 2 1
Congress initially used this power principally to organize and govern
areas such as the Louisiana Purchase lands that fell outside the bounda-
ries of the original thirteen states.126 Congress expected that such territo-
119. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008) (noting ties of unincorporat-
ed territory to United States may "strengthen in ways that are of constitutional signifi-
cance"); cf. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 599-600 (1976) (observing "[t]he Court's decisions respecting the rights of the inha-
bitants of Puerto Rico have been neither unambiguous nor exactly uniform" but deeming
equal protection requirements applicable to governmental action in Puerto Rico).
120. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755 (noting Congress's constitutional power
over territories); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 321 (1978) ("[A] territorial gov-
ernment is entirely the creation of Congress .... ").
121. See generally Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra note 6, at 985 (describing
uncertainty in nineteenth century over application of Constitution to territories);
Cleveland, supra note 4, at 163-65 (describing early controversies over Congress's author-
ity with respect to new territories).
122. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
123. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 430 (1973) (acknowledg-
ing Congress's plenary power over territories). Despite the clear textual grant of congres-
sional power over the territories, early cases often described this power, like Congress's
plenary authority over Indian tribes, as "inherent" in federal sovereignty rather than based
in any specific enumerated power of Congress. Cleveland, supra note 4, at 25-27. A para-
llel provision of the Constitution establishes comparable congressional authority over the
District of Columbia. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving Congress authority "[t]o exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States").
124. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 296 (1958).
125. See Report by the President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status, supra note 39,
at 19 ("It has been the position of several previous administrations that the question of
Puerto Rico's status should be answered by the people of Puerto Rico.").
126. For discussion of this early history, see generally Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining
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ries would become additional states in the Union, as indeed they did.12 7
But in the Spanish-American War, the United States acquired sovereignty
over so-called "insular"-i.e., overseas-territories such as the Philippines
and Puerto Rico that federal officials at the time did not expect to admit
to the Union as states.'"2 Today, five major nonstate "insular" areas re-
main under U.S. sovereignty: Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands
(USVI), American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands (CNMI). 12
The trajectory of federal policy with respect to such territories
roughly parallels the history of federal Indian policy. Although histori-
cally, federal governance of such territories was often heavy handed,130 in
recent decades Congress has adopted a policy of allowing local self-
governance. Beginning in the 1950s, Congress revised the "organic" stat-
utes establishing local territorial governments to provide for locally
elected governors as well as legislatures.13 1 It has approved a locally
drafted constitution for Puerto Rico,132 and it has authorized the drafting
of such constitutions for Guam'33 and the USVI (though neither has yet
adopted one).' 34 As a result, territorial authorities today in all five major
Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations 6-13 (1989);
Bartholomew H. Sparrow, The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire 14-
30 (2006).
127. Sparrow, supra note 126, at 15. The Constitution permits Congress to admit new
states to the Union, provided that "no new States shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be by the Junction of two or more States, or
Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as
of the Congress." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
128. Professor Christina Duffy Burnett has argued that it was initially controversial
whether the Constitution permitted the United States to later "deannex" nonstate areas
over which it had asserted sovereignty. Burnett, Untied States, supra note 36, at 798-800;
see also Sparrow, supra note 126, at 4-5 (discussing constitutional controversies surround-
ing U.S. sovereignty over such territories).
129. See generally Laughlin, Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions, supra note 16, at
25-43 (discussing history of U.S. relations with these territories); Leibowitz, supra note
126, at 140-46, 241-75, 318-23, 335-39 (same).
130. For an account of early federal policy with respect to some unincorporated terri-
tories, see Leibowitz, supra note 126, at 140-44, 255-57, 318-23; see also, e.g., Sparrow,
supra note 126, at 169-211 (discussing political prosecutions conducted without jury trial
in Hawaii, Philippines, and Puerto Rico).
131. See generally Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 132 (describing transition
from elected to appointed governors in territories).
132. 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b-731d (2006).
133. Id. §§ 1421-1424-4.
134. Id. §§ 1571-1613a. A constitutional convention in the U.S. Virgin Islands recent-
ly proposed a constitution that Congress returned to the territory for further considera-
tion of certain controversial provisions. See Act ofJune 30, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-194, 124
Stat. 1309; Dep't of Justice Views on the Proposed Constitution Drafted by the Fifth
Constitutional Convention of the U.S.V.I., 34 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2010), available at
www.justice.gov/olc/2010/usvi-doj-view-ltr100223.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
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U.S. territories enforce locally enacted criminal prohibitions in parallel
to federal criminal enforcement, much like a state (or tribal) govern-
ment.
Nevertheless, constitutional principles governing criminal law en-
forcement by territorial governments differ in several significant respects
from the principles applicable to state governments. For one thing, be-
cause territorial governments (unlike states or, for that matter, Indian
tribes) have no independent inherent sovereignty but rather derive all
their governmental power from Congress, the Supreme Court has histor-
ically held that double jeopardy bars separate prosecution for the same
crime by federal and territorial authorities.'" Federal and territorial laws,
the Court has reasoned, are "creations emanating from the same sover-
eignty," so a crime against the territorial government is not a separate
offense from the federal crime for double jeopardy purposes.136 But the
federal circuits have split over the applicability of these holdings to
Puerto Rico, which has not only a democratically elected local govern-
ment but also a locally approved constitution. The First Circuit has held
that Puerto Rico's substantial practical autonomy from federal control
makes it a "separate sovereign" for double jeopardy purposes,'37 while
the Eleventh Circuit has rejected this view.138
In addition, the Supreme Court held in the Insular Cases-landmark
constitutional decisions from the turn of the last century-that the crim-
inal procedure requirements of the Bill of Rights apply only partially in
territories that Congress has not permanently "incorporated" into the
United States.'39 Justice White first articulated this view in a concurring
Review) (commenting on proposed constitution).
135. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907) ("[T]he government
of the Philippines owes its existence wholly to the United States.. .. So that the cases hold-
ing that the same acts committed in a State . . . may constitute an offense against the
United States and also a distinct offense against the State, do not apply here . . . ."); see
also Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937) ("Both the territorial and federal
laws and the courts .. . are creations emanating from the same sovereignty.").
136. Shell Co., 302 U.S. at 264.
137. See United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
"Puerto Rico is to be treated as a state for purposes of the double jeopardy clause" because
"its criminal laws, like those of a state, emanate from a different source than the federal
laws"); see also, e.g., United States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 42 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1987)
(following Lopez Andino).
138. United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1151-52 (11th Cir.) ("We disagree with
the conclusion of the First Circuit that Congress' decision to permit self-governance in
Puerto Rico makes Puerto Rico a separate sovereign for double jeopardy purposes....
Puerto Rico is still constitutionally a territory, and not a separate sovereign."), modified on
other grounds, 3 F.3d 366 (11th Cir. 1993).
139. There is disagreement about the precise set of decisions qualifying as Insular
Cases. See, e.g., Sparrow, supra note 126, at 257 (noting "[a]lmost every writer on the
Insular Cases has his or her own particular list of cases, from as few as three to as many as
twenty-three" and selecting an "expansive list" of thirty-five cases to include in the cate-
gory); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Note on the Insular Cases, in Foreign in a Domestic
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opinion in the 1901 case Downes v. Bidwell. There, the Court upheld im-
port duties on goods shipped from Puerto Rico to the mainland on the
grounds that Puerto Rico was not part of the "United States" for purposes
of the Tax Uniformity Clause, 40 which requires that "all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."14
Characterizing the United States' new insular possessions as "foreign to
the United States in a domestic sense," though not subject to foreign
sovereignty, he concluded that constitutional provisions such as the Tax
Uniformity Clause would not automatically restrict the federal govern-
ment's actions in governing these areas. 42
In later decisions, the full Court adopted Justice White's framework
and applied it to deem the Fifth and Sixth Amendment requirements of
grand jury indictment and criminal jury trial inapplicable in the
Philippines (then a U.S. territory), Hawaii (then considered an unincor-
porated territory), and Puerto Rico.143 At the same time, the Court made
clear that "[tihe guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights de-
clared in the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, had from
the beginning full application in the Philippines and Porto [sic] Rico."' 44
Much as Congress exercised its plenary authority over Indian affairs
to impose criminal procedure requirements of the Bill of Rights on tribal
governments, Congress eventually imposed most Bill of Rights require-
ments on territorial governments. Today, by and large, constitutional
Sense, supra note 36, at 389, 389-92 (discussing which cases to include in category). In
Boumediene, the Supreme Court cited six decisions as "Insular Cases." See Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756-57 (2008) (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)). As discussed in Boumediene, several of these
cases established the "doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution
applies in full in incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in
unincorporated Territories." 553 U.S. at 757 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143; Downes, 182 U.S.
at 293 (White, J., concurring)).
140. 182 U.S. at 287 (majority opinion) ("We are therefore of opinion that the Island
of Porto [sic] Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a
part of the United States within the revenue clauses of tle Constitution . . .
141. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
142. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341-42 (WhiteJ., concurring).
143. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922) (discussing inapplic-
ability of grand jury indictment requirements in Puerto Rico); Dor, 195 U.S. at 148-49
(concluding "power to govern territory ... given to Congress in the Constitution .. . does
not require that body to enact for ceded territory not made a part of the United States ...
a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury"); Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 217-
18 (holding inapplicable rights to grand jury indictment and criminal jury trial in Hawaii
since these rights are "not fundamental in their nature, but concern merely a method of
procedure").
144. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312-13.
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requirements applicable to the federal government apply in federal
courts in the territories, while local territorial governments are subject by
statute to criminal procedure requirements that apply to states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.145 Those constitutional requirements for state
prosecutions include nearly all the requirements of the federal Bill of
Rights, though not the requirements of grand jury indictment under the
Fifth Amendment and conviction by unanimous jury verdict at trial un-
der the Sixth Amendment.146
There are, however, three major exceptions to the pattern of statu-
tory protection of constitutional rights in the territories. First, in
American Samoa, there is no statutory right to jury trial. Congress has
never enacted an organic statute establishing a local government for
American Samoa.14 1 Instead, Congress has simply provided that
145. The bills of rights for Guam and the USVI are codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421b,
1561 (2006), respectively. The Ninth Circuit construed arguably ambiguous language in
the Guam statute not to apply the Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury indictment
to territorial prosecutions. See Territory of Guam v. Inglett, 417 F.2d 123, 124-25 (9th Cir.
1969) ("[W]e are inclined to agree ... that Congress did not intend by enacting section
10(u) of the Guam elective Governor Act to repeal 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b) and thus deprive
the Guam legislature of the power to determine whether offenses should be prosecuted by
indictment or information."). Territorial statutes in Guam, however, require unanimous
trial jury verdicts and grand jury indictment for felony offenses under territorial law. 8
Guam Code Ann. §§ 1.15, 105.30 (1997). Puerto Rico's constitution does not require
grand jury indictment and permits jury verdicts by a 9-3 vote. P.R. Const. art. II, § 11.
Requirements in American Samoa and CNMI are discussed further below. See infra notes
147-159, 288-304 and accompanying text.
Outside of Puerto Rico, federal courts in the insular territories do not satisfy the re-
quirements of federal courts under Article III of the Constitution because their judges do
not hold life tenure during good behavior, but they generally do apply usual federal pro-
cedural law. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 119, 132-135, 461 (2006) (applying general salary and
tenure provisions for federal district judges to U.S. District Court for District of Puerto
Rico), with 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1424b (establishing that federal judges for District of Guam
hold office for ten-year terms and are removable for cause), id. §§ 1611, 1614 (same for
District Court of USVI), and id. § 1821 (same for District Court for NMI). See also Fed. R.
Crim. P. 1 (a) (1), (3) (applying federal criminal procedure rules to all district courts and
to federal courts in territories, with limited exceptions). Whether particular general
federal statutes apply in the territories turns on congressional intent. See generally
Elizabeth Vicens, Note, Application of the Federal Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico: A
New Test for the Locally Inapplicable Standard, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 350 (2005) (discussing
statutory standard extending all federal laws to Puerto Rico that are not "locally
inapplicable").
146. For discussion of the case law on these issues regarding states, see infra notes
201-206 and accompanying text.
147. American Samoa is also unique in that it falls within the territorial jurisdiction of
no federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (listing judicial districts but not includ-
ing American Samoa). The federal government has prosecuted American Samoans for
federal offenses by bringing them to Hawaii and obtaining jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3238 (2006), which permits prosecution for offenses committed "out of the jurisdiction of
any particular State or district" in the district to which the offender "is first brought." See,
e.g., United States v. Lee, 472 F.3d 638, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Because American Samoa
is not within any judicial district, venue was proper in the District of Hawaii in accordance
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American Samoa's local constitution, developed under the auspices of
the Secretary of the Interior, cannot be amended without congressional
approval.""4 That constitution, by its terms, does not provide for any form
ofjury trial in criminal prosecutions."'4 As described in greater detail be-
low,'" however, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
applying the D.C. Circuit's understanding of the Insular Cases, concluded
that the Constitution requires a jury trial in criminal cases in local
American Samoan courts.' 5 1
Second, there is also no right to jury trial in all criminal prosecutions
in CNMI. The basic governmental arrangement for CNMI is established
by a "covenant" under which the United States assumed sovereignty over
the territory.'52 Although this covenant extends nearly all requirements
of the Bill of Rights to the territory, the covenant specifies that "neither
trial by jury nor indictment by grand jury shall be required in any civil
action or criminal prosecution based on local law, except where required
by local law."15' The CNMI legislature has not required grand jury indict-
ment for local offenses,' 54 and (with certain limited exceptions) has pro-
vided for jury trial only for felonies punishable by more than five years'
incarceration or a $2,000 fine.'-" By contrast, the Fifth Amendment re-
with § 3238.").
148. 48 U.S.C. § 1662a.
149. See Rev. Const. of Am. Sam., art. I, § 6, available at http://www.house.gov/
faleomavaega/samoan-constitution.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Apr. 11, 2013) (describing rights of accused without any reference to right to jury
trial).
150. See infra notes 288-291 and accompanying text (discussing King v. Morton, 520
F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1977)).
151. See Morton, 520 F.2d at 1147-48 (remanding for determination whether right to
jury trial applies in American Samoa based on "a solid understanding of the present legal
and cultural development of American Samoa"); see also Andrus, 452 F. Supp. at 17 (find-
ing denial ofjury trial in criminal cases in American Samoa unconstitutional). See gener-
ally Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 18, at 352 (advocating constitutional
analysis based on Morton).
152. After World War II, the Mariana Islands became part of a "trust territory"
administered by the United States under a grant of authority from the United Nations.
While the other components of this trust territory elected to become independent nations
linked to the United States through treaties of "free association," CNMI's electorate voted
in a referendum to accept United States sovereignty. See generally Laughlin, Territories
and Affiliated Jurisdictions, supra note 16, at 95-101; Chimene I. Keitner & W. Michael
Reisman, Free Association: The United States Experience, 39 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1, 33-45
(2003); Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 18, at 429-32.
153. 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (Article V: Applicability of Laws).
154. See CNMI R. Crim. P. 7(a) ("All offenses except misdemeanors shall be prose-
cuted by information.").
155. 7 N. Mar. I. Code § 3101 (a) (2011); CNMI R. Crim. P. 23(b); see also 6 N. Mar.
I. Code § 2150(a) (8) (2011) (providing right to jury trial "in all cases in which the value of
property subject to forfeiture under this sub-section exceeds $2,000"). See generally
Commonwealth v. Demapan, No. 04-0006-GA, 2008 WL 3982060, at *3 (N. Mar. I. Aug. 15,
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quires grand jury indictment for federal felonies,'5 6 and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments require a jury trial for any "non-petty" offense,
a category that includes any crime punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment.157 In a decision addressed further below,' 58 the Ninth
Circuit, again applying the Insular Cases, upheld this partial application
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in CNMI.'"
Finally, in the USVI, grand jury indictment is optional even for fed-
eral offenses charged in the federal trial court for the territory.'" For
territorial offenses, such indictment is generally required only to the ex-
tent that local legislation provides for it (and no such local legislation has
been enacted).16 ' The Third Circuit tersely rejected a challenge to these
provisions, holding that the Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury
indictment is "not applicable" in this "unincorporated" territory, where
"prosecutions have always been instituted by information rather than by
indictment." 16
2008) (demonstrating use of jury for assault with deadly weapon conviction but not for
lesser convictions); Commonwealth v. Bias, No. 04-028-GA, 2004 WL 3704018, at *1 n.4
(N. Mar. 1. Dec. 10, 2004) ("[O~nly the CNMI Legislature has the authority to make the
right to a jury trial the same as in the continental United States." (citing 48 U.S.C. § 1801
note; Commonwealth v. Peters, 1 N. Mar. 1. 466,473 (1991))).
156. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger. . . ."). Crimes are generally considered "infamous" under the Fifth
Amendment if they are felonies or are otherwise punishable by imprisonment in a peni-
tentiary. As a practical matter, under governing federal statutes, that includes all offenses
punishable by incarceration for more than a year. See 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (2006); Green v.
United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958) (indicating "an 'infamous crime' within the mean-
ing of the [Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause] is one punishable by imprisonment in a
penitentiary," and "imprisonment in a penitentiary can be imposed only if a crime is sub-
ject to imprisonment exceeding one year" (citations omitted)), overruled on other
grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059,
1063 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994) (defining "infamous crime" as one "punishable by imprisonment
exceeding one year").
157. U.S. Const. amend. VI; id. amend. XIV; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69
(1970) (concluding "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by
jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized").
158. See infra notes 292-297 and accompanying text.
159. See Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984)
(upholding limited jury trial rights in CNMI).
160. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1561, 1612 (2006).
161. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 3581 (1997) ("Every felony and every criminal action
in the district court shall be prosecuted by information."); United States v. Plaskett, Crim.
No. 2007-60, 2008 WL 444552, at *2 (D.V.I. Feb. 4, 2008) (finding "neither federal nor
territorial crimes must be charged by indictment in the Virgin Islands" because "[n]o such
local law ... has been enacted" (citations omitted)).
162. Gov't of V.I. v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 667 (3d Cir. 1980); see also United States
v. Ntreh, 279 F.3d 255, 256-58 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing Virgin Islands residents have no
constitutional or statutory right to indictment); United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892,
898-99 (3d Cir. 1981) (reviewing rationale for territorial governance and finding "no
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2. New Uncertainty in the Framework. - Much as with federal Indian
law, the Supreme Court has, of late, cast into doubt the constitutional
understandings underlying the governance of the insular territories. Dis-
playing the same discomfort with extraconstitutional authority evident in
the Oliphant trilogy, the Supreme Court has questioned the applicability
of the Insular Cases in their original context, the unincorporated territo-
ries, even as it has invoked them as key precedents for applying the
Constitution in other areas outside the United States proper, such as
Guantanamo Bay. Meanwhile, some recent federalism and separation of
powers decisions raise implicit questions about the longstanding practice
of territorial criminal enforcement without "meaningful Presidential
control." 63
The Court's shift towards its current approach began in the 1957
case of Reid v. Covert.'" There, a highly fractured Court addressed
whether civilian spouses of service personnel on overseas military bases
could be tried in military courts without the protection of the full Bill of
Rights." A plurality of fourjustices categorically rejected this practice.'"
These justices distinguished the Insular Cases as "involv[ing] the power of
Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily territo-
ries with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions"; stressing that "nei-
ther the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be given any further
expansion," they deemed the Constitution applicable "in its entirety ...
to [these] trials."" In contrast, concurring opinions by Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan drew express support from the Insular Cases.' 
Justice Harlan, in particular, echoed Justice White's reasoning in
Downes'69 by proposing that
there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition
precedent to exercising power over Americans overseas, must
exercise it subject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no
matter what the conditions and considerations are that would
make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether impractical
and anomalous.' 70
constitutional basis for investigatory grand juries in the territory").
163. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997).
164. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 40-41.
167. Id. at 13-14, 18.
168. Id. at 51 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 63-67 & n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing Insular Cases, including
Downes).
170. Id. at 74.
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He concluded that military trial should be permissible for "run-of-the-
mill offenses" committed by servicemembers' dependents but not for the
capital offenses at issue in Reid.17 1
In the ensuing decades, the Supreme Court largely avoided address-
ing whether the Insular Cases remained good law by holding in a series of
decisions that the particular constitutional rights at issue were applicable
in the circumstances of those cases."' In 2006, however, in Boumediene v.
Bush, the Court adopted the pragmatic, context-specific approach of
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Reid as a general standard for the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution. The Court held specifi-
cally, based on several practical factors it considered relevant, that the
Habeas Suspension Clause of the Constitution applied to military detain-
ees at a base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, an area subject to dejure Cuban
sovereignty but de facto permanent control by the United States. 7 1
Justice Kennedy, in the majority opinion, drew support for this ap-
proach from the Insular Cases, much as Justice Harlan did in Reid. Justice
Kennedy emphasized that the Insular Cases were rooted in a principle of
cultural accommodation. Those cases, he reasoned, addressed the ap-
plicability of the U.S. Constitution's guarantees in "former Spanish colo-
nies [that had] operated under a civil-law system, without experience in
the various aspects of the Anglo-American legal tradition, for instance
the use of grand and petitjuries.""'Justice Kennedy explained:
At least with regard to the Philippines, a complete transfor-
mation of the prevailing legal culture would have been not only
disruptive but also unnecessary, as the United States intended to
grant independence to that Territory. The Court thus was reluc-
tant to risk the uncertainty and instability that could result from
a rule that displaced altogether the existing legal systems in
these newly acquired Territories. These considerations resulted
in the doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the
Constitution applies in full in incorporated Territories surely
destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated
Territories. 175
171. Id. at 75-78.
172. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 331
(1986) (free speech); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979) (unreasonable
search and seizure); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 572, 601-02 (1976) (equal protection); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-69 n.5 (1974) (due process).
173. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755, 771 (2008). The Court's adoption of
this pragmatic analysis in Boumediene echoed an earlier concurring opinion by the
Boumediene majority opinion's author, justice Kennedy, in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (citing Insular Cases and justice Harlan's Reid con-
currence in concluding Fourth Amendment warrant requirement did not apply to search
in Mexico).
174. 553 U.S. at 757.
175. Id. (citations omitted).
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The Boumediene majority thus explained the Insular Cases narrowly in
terms of a putative need for cultural accommodation in light of the pre-
sumed impermanence of American sovereignty. This characterization
permitted the Court to assimilate the Insular Cases into its general,
practicality-focused approach to extraterritoriality.17 6 The Court, how-
ever, pointedly illustrated the logic of the Insular Cases by reference only
to the Philippines, a territory to which the United States had granted
independence over fifty years earlier."' With respect to territories still re-
tained by the United States in 2006, the Court hinted at further exten-
sions of constitutional rights. The Court observed: "It may well be that
over time the ties between the United States and any of its unincorpo-
rated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional signifi-
cance."17 8
Accordingly, although in Boumediene the Court specifically addressed
only the application of the Constitution to the extraterritorial area of
Guantanamo Bay, the majority's analysis appears to raise anew the ques-
tion of the Constitution's applicability in insular territories such as Guam
and Puerto Rico.'79 At the same time, separate developments in case law
regarding federalism and separation of powers threaten to undermine
the long-accepted practice of autonomous territorial enforcement of
criminal prohibitions enacted by territorial legislatures. Although there
are historical examples of enforcement of federal criminal prohibitions
176. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v.
Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259, 270 (2009) (describing Boumediene as giving "sanitized account
of the motivations for the Insular Cases doctrine" but noting "such simplification is hardly
atypical in tracing a line of precedent").
177. 22 U.S.C. § 1394(a) (2006) (recognizing independence of Philippines);
Proclamation No. 2695, 3 C.F.R. 64 (Supp. 1946) (same).
178. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758. The Court also pointedly cited justice Brennan's
concurrence in Torres v. Puerto Rico, where he stated that "'[w] hatever the validity of the
[Insular Cases] in the particular historical context in which they were decided, those cases
are clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth Amendment-or
any other provision of the Bill of Rights-to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the
1970's."' Id. (quoting Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
179. Shortly after Boumediene, the federal district court in Puerto Rico held, based in
part on the Court's statements in that case, that Puerto Rico is now an incorporated terri-
tory to which the Constitution is fully applicable. Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v.
Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 33, 43 (D.P.R. 2008); see also Jesse Merriam, A Clarification of
the Constitution's Application Abroad: Making the "Impracticable and Anomalous"
Standard More Practicable and Less Anomalous, 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 171, 203
(2012) (interpreting Boumediene to establish that "[i]f a constitutional claim arises in a
land over which the United States exercises absolute control or exclusive jurisdiction, and
if the court deems that the claim involves a 'fundamental meaning' of the Constitution,
then the court should apply the Constitution as it would if the claim had arisen domesti-
cally"). For a contrary view that Boumediene entrenches the Insular Cases, creating "second-




by nonfederal actors,so the Supreme Court indicated in 1997 in Printz v.
United States that, by virtue of the President's constitutional responsibility
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," s8 execution of fed-
eral laws must be subject to "meaningful Presidential control." 82 The
Court also suggested that executive functions must be performed by ex-
ecutive branch officers subject (directly or indirectly) to presidential ap-
pointment and removal under the Appointments Clause.'83 The Clause
requires appointment of all "Officers of the United States" by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate or, in the case of "in-
ferior Officers," either by that method or by "the President alone," the
"Head[] of [a] Department[]," or a "Court[] of Law." 84 The Court's
decisions, moreover, suggest that the requirement of presidential control
carries particular force in the criminal context.8 5
If these principles were applied without modification to the territo-
ries-as the Court's skepticism about the constitutional exceptionalism
of the Insular Cases implies may be necessary-they would render auton-
omous criminal enforcement by the existing local territorial govern-
ments unconstitutional. In the federal Indian law context, Justice
Thomas mused in his concurring opinion in Lara that Congress's Duro
fix could not be interpreted as a delegation of federal power, because
"[t] he power to bring federal prosecutions, which is part of the putative
delegated power, is manifestly and quintessentially executive power" and,
as such, cannot be transferred by Congress "to individuals who are be-
yond 'meaningful Presidential control."" 86 Yet the criminal enforcement
authority of elected territorial officials is at once federally delegated and
not presidentially controlled. Indeed, for this very reason, two scholars
have recently argued that, at least on originalist and formalist premises,
180. See HaroldJ. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 275, 292-309 (1989) (describing roles of private
citizens and state governments in early federal criminal law enforcement).
181. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
182. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997).
183. Id.
184. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (arguing President must have some power of appointment and
removal over those who bring federal prosecutions); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691
(1988) (noting criminal "law enforcement functions ... typically have been undertaken by
officials within the Executive Branch"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per
curiam) (indicating that only officers appointed in accordance with the Appointments
Clause may "conduct[] civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating
public rights"); see also Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal
Crimes in State Courts, 97 Va. L. Rev. 243, 296-302 (2011) (describing constitutional is-
sues accompanying state prosecution of federal crimes).
186. Lara, 541 U.S. at 216 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Printz,
521 U.S. at 922-23).
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territorial self-governance is unconstitutional under the Appointments
Clause.'87
The Court's apparent skepticism about constitutional exceptional-
ism in the territories threatens to create grave legal uncertainties-un-
certainties that closely parallel those created by the Court's hostility to
extraconstitutional authority in the federal Indian law context. If the
United States' "ties" to its insular territories have "strengthen [ed] in ways
that are of constitutional significance," as Boumediene suggests,' then
previously settled explanations regarding the constitutionality of self-
governance arrangements for the territories may be open to question,
and the Court's cases permit serious doubts as to how territorial govern-
ments may depart from either structural or procedural guarantees of the
Constitution while exercising federally delegated power.
C. States
Before turning to an affirmative analysis of the path forward on
these issues, it is useful to account briefly for related federal-state con-
texts that present important analogies for the criminal jurisdiction exer-
cised by tribal and territorial governments.
States, of course, hold a very different position in the polity from
tribal and territorial governments. As constituent elements of our feder-
alist republic, states and their citizens are represented directly in the na-
tional legislature. Moreover, as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment,
they hold plenary governmental authority within their borders, except
insofar as such power is constrained by the federal constitution or
preempted by valid federal legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's
limited, enumerated powers.189 Nevertheless, in at least two contexts,
state criminal jurisdiction may arise from federal authorization through a
process analogous to federal conferral of criminal jurisdiction on native
and territorial governments. 9 o
187. See Lawson &c Seidman, supra note 10, at 136 ("[Tjerritorial officials ... se-
lected in any fashion that does not comply with the Appointments Clause cannot execute
the laws of the United States . . . [or] territorial laws, to the extent that the latter are also,
for constitutional purposes, laws of the United States.").
188. 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008).
189. U.S. Const. amend. X (reserving to states and the people powers not conferred
on federal government); see also, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)
("[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime
and vindication of its victims.").
190. The examples discussed here are analogous to federal authorization of tribal or
territorial jurisdiction in that they involve situations where a state's authority to punish
violations of its own state laws depends on federal authorization. Some have suggested that
Congress could also authorize states to punish federal crimes. For a discussion of the consti-
tutional issues any such enactment would raise, see Collins & Nash, supra note 185, at
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First, Congress may create state criminal jurisdiction by relaxing re-
quirements of the so-called "dormant" Commerce Clause. The
Commerce Clause, by its terms, provides Congress with affirmative au-
thority to regulate interstate commerce, but this authority has long been
understood to entail a "negative" aspect as well. This negative or
"dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause bars state commercial regula-
tion if it (1) "discriminates against interstate commerce" without "'ad-
vanc[ing] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives"'191 or (2) imposes a burden
on interstate commerce that is "'clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits."" 2 Congress, however, may relax these limitations on
state authority by "authoriz[ing] state regulations," 93 including criminal
laws,'" "that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce." 95
Second, Congress also may delegate elements of federal criminal ju-
risdiction in Indian country to states. Under a complex patchwork of
statutes and judicial doctrines, federal and tribal governments generally
hold sole jurisdiction (to the exclusion of states) over crimes by or
against Indians in Indian country, while states hold sole jurisdiction (to
the exclusion of tribes and the federal government) over crimes by non-
Indians without Indian victims.'96
246-49.
191. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994)).
192. Id. at 338-39 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
193. Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003).
194. See, e.g., USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1282 (2d Cir.
1995) (addressing dormant Commerce Clause challenge to civil and criminal regulations);
Pic-a-State PA, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 42 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding state criminal
law that "complements [a] federal statute" does not violate dormant Commerce Clause).
195. Hillside Dairy, 539 U.S. at 66; see also, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130, 154 (1982) ("When Congress has struck the balance it deems appropriate, the
courts are no longer needed to prevent States from burdening commerce, and it matters
not that the courts would invalidate the state tax or regulation under the Commerce
Clause in the absence of congressional action.").
196. This distribution of criminal jurisdiction results principally from two federal stat-
utes. First, the Major Crimes Act establishes federal jurisdiction over Indians who commit
specified major offenses such as murder and rape in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006). Tribal courts likely retain concurrentjurisdiction over these offenses, although the
Supreme Court has not resolved this issue. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325
n.22 (1978) (reserving question); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203
n.14 (1978) (same); Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding concur-
rent tribal court jurisdiction). Second, the Indian Country Crimes Act establishes federal
jurisdiction over other crimes in Indian country, unless the offense is committed by an
Indian against another Indian or involves an Indian perpetrator who has already been
punished under tribal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. This statute also does not oust tribal court
jurisdiction; indeed, it preserves exclusive tribal jurisdiction for Indian-on-Indian crimes,
and by barring federal jurisdiction where a tribal court has already imposed punishment,
it presupposes tribal court jurisdiction for other offenses by Indian offenders. Id. Although
the plain language of the Indian Country Crimes Act might appear to cover offenses by
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This basic distribution of criminal enforcement authority has deep
historical roots in treaties, statutes, and case law. It reflects in part the
presumption, established in the Marshall Court's foundational prece-
dents, that the federal government, and not the states, bears constitu-
tional responsibility for regulating relations between Indians and non-
Indians."' Yet the Supreme Court has held that Congress's plenary
authority over Indian affairs entails "plenary authority to alter these ju-
risdictional guideposts."'9" Congress "has exercised [this authority] from
time to time" by conferring elements of historically federal criminal ju-
risdiction on states. 99 States receiving such jurisdictional authorization
from Congress apply their usual state criminal laws to offenses that would
otherwise be matters within federal jurisdiction.20 0
non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian Country, the Supreme Court held that states
have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses. See Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240,
247 (1896) ("[Iln reserving to the United States jurisdiction and control over Indian lands
it was not intended to deprive that State of power to punish for crimes committed on a
reservation or Indian lands by other than Indians or against Indians. . . ."); United States
v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) ("But that treaty contains no stipulation for the
punishment of offences committed by white men against white men."). In addition to the
federal jurisdiction conferred by the Major Crimes Act and Indian Country Crimes Act,
federal criminal prohibitions of nationwide applicability (such as federal narcotics and
organized crime laws) apply in Indian country, just as they do elsewhere in the United
States. See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330 n.30 ("Federal jurisdiction ... extends . . . to
crimes over which there is federal jurisdiction regardless of whether an Indian is involved,
such as assaulting a federal officer .... ). For a general discussion of this jurisdictional
framework, see Cohen, supra note 16, at 735-69.
197. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text (discussing tribes' relationship
with federal government).
198. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993).
199. Id. For examples of statutes conferring elements of federal criminal jurisdiction
on states in areas of Indian country, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 ("Each of the States or
Territories listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by
or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed . . . ."); 25 U.S.C. § 232 (2006)
("The State of New York shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians on Indian reservations within the State of New York to the same extent as the
courts of the State have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within. . .. ").
200. Commentators have faulted statutes conferring federal criminal jurisdiction on
states (the most significant of which, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, is known as Public Law 280) for
contributing to a collapse of law and order on affected reservations. See, e.g., Carole
Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Searching for an Exit: The Indian Civil Rights Act and
Public Law 280, in The Indian Civil Rights Act at Forty, supra note 75, at 248-59 (discuss-
ing alleged state civil rights violations in Public Law 280 jurisdictions); Carole E. Goldberg,
Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. Rev.
535, 538 (1975) (noting dissatisfaction of states and Indians with law); Carole Goldberg-
Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44
UCLA L. Rev. 1405, 1418 (1997) ("Taking account of the direct and indirect effects. . . ,
Public Law 280 has itself become a source of lawlessness on reservations."). These statutes
have also created ambiguity over the extent of retained tribal and federal jurisdiction in
affected jurisdictions. See, e.g., Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and
State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1632-36 (1998) (examin-
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Federal authorization of state criminal jurisdiction in these two con-
texts, much like federal authorization of tribal or territorial jurisdiction,
raises the question of whether and to what degree resulting state prohibi-
tions and their enforcement should be viewed as federal action for con-
stitutional purposes. In light of Printz's holding that enforcement of fed-
eral laws must be subject to "meaningful Presidential control,"20' should
such control be required when states exercise federally conferred crimi-
nal jurisdiction? Should double jeopardy bar federal reprosecution fol-
lowing a state prosecution pursuant to a federal jurisdictional grant? And
should states have to follow requirements of the Bill of Rights that apply
only to the federal government, not the states-most notably the re-
quirements of grand jury indictment 2 2 and trial jury unanimity203-in
conducting such prosecutions?
In practice, the answer to all these questions is "no." Courts have
treated exercises of state power pursuant to congressional relaxation of
the dormant Commerce Clause or federal delegation of Indian country
jurisdiction as state, rather than federal, action for constitutional pur-
poses.
ing law's disruptive effects),
201. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997).
202. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884) (holding grand jury re-
quirement in Fifth Amendment does not apply to states).
203. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (upholding jury verdicts by
margins of 10-2 and 11-1); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972) (upholding
jury verdict by margin of 9-3). In contrast, while the Supreme Court has upheld the use of
juries with as few as six members (though not fewer), e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,
245 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970), it has required unanimous
verdicts from such juries, even in state court, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139
(1979).
The Supreme Court has also never definitively held the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tions on excessive fines and excessive bail to be incorporated, although it has described
bail as "basic to our system of law" and noted that "the Eighth Amendment's proscription
of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment." Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971); see also McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-35 nn.12-13 (2010) (suggesting prohibition on
excessive bail is incorporated but prohibition on excessive fines is not).
In McDonald, which applied the Second Amendment to the states, the Supreme Court
made clear that it views the incomplete incorporation of constitutional jury rights as
anomalous. See id. at 3035 & nn.13-14 (characterizing result in Apodaca, in which Court
produced no majority opinion, as resulting from "an unusual division among the Justices"
and Court's grand jury decisions as "long predat[ing]" Court's modern approach to in-
corporation). Some commentators have suggested that the flexibility granted to the states
with respect to juries is inconsistent with the putatively originalist and formalist approach
the Court has taken in recent cases addressing what questions juries must resolve (in state
or federal court) in criminal trials. See, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modem
Judges: Oiginalism's Uneasy Relationship with the Jury, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 959, 961 (2010)
("The jury of 2010 bears ... faint resemblance to the jury of 1791 . . . ."). Nevertheless, the
Court recently denied certiorari in a well-briefed case seeking to overrule Apodaca and
completely incorporate Sixth Amendment jury rights against the states. Herrera v.
Oregon, 131 S. Ct. 904 (2011) (mem.).
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The Supreme Court itself endorsed this result with respect to the
dormant Commerce Clause. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, the
Court held that state laws resulting from federal authorization of discrim-
inatory commercial regulation are an "exertion of [the state's] own
power" and not a "delegation of Congress's legislative power to the
states."204 Accordingly, the only constitutional limitations on state en-
forcement of such laws are those that ordinarily apply to state govern-
mental action.
Courts likewise appear to view state prosecutions pursuant to a fed-
eral grant of Indian country jurisdiction as state action, and not federal
government action, for constitutional purposes.20 5 The reason why is less
clear. Courts, commentators, and Congress itself have generally viewed
statutes conferring elements of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country on states as delegations of federal authority over relations with
Indian nations.206 But if that is so, then why should resulting state actions
not be considered federal in character for constitutional purposes?2 "7
The best answer is probably that statutes conferring federal Indian coun-
try jurisdiction on states should be understood to have the same charac-
ter as legislation relaxing the dormant Commerce Clause. The federal
legislation, in other words, relaxes a default constitutional preemption of
state authority, permitting the state to exercise its usual plenary criminal
jurisdiction in areas of its territory where federal law would otherwise bar
such jurisdiction.20 s This theory could make sense of the treatment of
resulting state prosecutions as state, rather than federal, action. But the
204. 328 U.S. 408, 438 & n.51 (1946) (rejecting claim that Tax Uniformity Clause,
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, applied to such state action).
205. The leading federal Indian law treatise reports that "[nlo court has ever sug-
gested . . . that a state court to which Congress has delegated jurisdiction over Indians is
obligated to provide indictment by a grand jury in criminal cases under the fifth
amendment." Cohen, supra note 16, at 532 & n.12.
206. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §1302(f) (Supp. V 2012) ("Nothing in this section affects the
obligation of the United States, or any State government that has been delegated authority
by the United States, to investigate and prosecute any criminal violation in Indian coun-
try."); Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2006) (describing statute as "delega-
tion of authority"); United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 840 & n.12 (8th Cir. 1998)
(referring to jurisdiction "delegated to certain states"); Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v.
Kennedy, 714 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (noting Congress "delegates certain
states . . . jurisdiction over most crimes and many civil matters throughout most of the
Indian country within their borders"); Cohen, supra note 16, at 531 ("Courts typically
characterize an exercise of federal power authorizing state jurisdiction over Indians in
Indian country as a delegation of Congress's otherwise preemptive authority over Indian
nations to the states.").
207. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton et al., American Indian Law: Native Nations and the
Federal System 677 (5th ed. 2007) (identifying issue as open question).
208. Cf. United States v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Upon cession of
such jurisdiction to a state, federal law no longer preempts the state's exercise of its inher-
ent police power over all persons within its borders. . . ."); Cohen, supra note 16, at 532
(proposing similar theory).
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theory conflicts with Congress's own characterization of jurisdiction-
conferring statutes as delegations of federal power rather than activations
of state power. 209 Thus, in at least one important context, state criminal
jurisdiction presents constitutional dilemmas similar to those that arise in
territorial and federal Indian law contexts.
D. Open Questions and the Counterproductive Focus on "Inherency"
The tribal, territorial, and state contexts present a series of related
questions regarding the constitutional implications of local exercise of
federally authorized criminal jurisdiction. Can tribes, territories, or states
autonomously enforce criminal sanctions imposed pursuant to a federal
grant of criminal jurisdiction, or must any such exercise of federally con-
ferred criminal enforcement authority be supervised by federal executive
officials accountable to the President? Should double jeopardy bar sub-
sequent prosecution by the federal government when a tribe, territory, or
state has imposed criminal punishment pursuant to a grant of authority
from Congress? And to what degree should constitutional constraints on
federal governmental action also bind local governments in such circum-
stances?
The answers to these questions might once have seemed settled, but
they have been thrown open by the Court's recent decisions. Given the
Court's hostility to extraconstitutional authority-despite previously tol-
erating it in Indian country and the unincorporated territories-Printz's
holding that federally derived criminal laws can be enforced only by offi-
cials accountable to the President may appear hard to square with the
autonomy of state, tribal, or territorial officials exercising criminal juris-
diction conferred on them by an act of Congress. Similarly, as the circuit
split over Puerto Rico and the multiple separate opinions in Lara attest,
the "separate sovereignty" doctrine of double jeopardy may be difficult to
apply when one government (a state, tribe, or territory) exercises crimi-
nal jurisdiction only with the permission of another (the federal govern-
ment). And the inapplicability of some or all constitutional procedural
rights in tribal or territorial prosecutions under Talton and the Insular
Cases appears to conflict with the animating concern of the Court's re-
cent cases, namely that the federal constitution should regulate govern-
ment action for which the federal government bears responsibility.
Some of the Court's decisions, and particularly the separate opin-
ions of some justices, suggest an inclination to resolve these questions by
distinguishing between inherent and delegated authority. The Court's
early double jeopardy decisions with respect to the territories support
this view, as does Talton's invocation of preconstitutional tribal sovereign-
ty to explain the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to Native American
209. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1302(f) ("Nothing in this section affects the obligation of
the United States, or any State government that has been delegated authority by the
United States, to investigate and prosecute any criminal violation in Indian country.").
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tribes. And the separate opinions ofJustice Thomas and Justice Souter in
Lara suggest that the applicability of structural and procedural require-
ments of the Constitution turns on this distinction. Likewise, some lower
courts have resolved these issues by reference to this framework.2"o
Yet rigid application of this binary distinction between inherent and
delegated authority would be counterproductive. In fact, this approach
has significant deficiencies, even as an explanation for existing law. In
the federal-state context, as this Article has demonstrated, the treatment
of federally authorized state prosecutions in Indian country as state ac-
tion might be shoehorned into the inherent authority framework by
characterizing such prosecutions as exercises of a reactivated inherent
authority of states over their territory. 211 But this view conflicts with
Congress's own characterization of its authorizing statutes as delega-
tions.212 In the territorial context, the permissibility of unsupervised pro-
secutions by territorial governments appears difficult to explain under
the inherent authority model, given that territorial governments exercise
only delegated federal power. Furthermore, departures from the Bill of
Rights under the Insular Cases would appear difficult to justify except on
the theory that the federal government itself could violate those rights,
yet the general pattern of congressional policy has been to allow territo-
rial governments greater flexibility with respect to criminal procedure
than the federal government.213
Finally, with respect to Indian tribes, legal recognition that their sov-
ereignty is at least partially inherent and not federally derived is critically
important to many Native Americans. This legal principle has political
and cultural significance as a belated acknowledgment of tribes' dignity
and standing as political communities. It has also provided a theoretical
foundation for autonomous tribal self-government, including criminal
enforcement without double jeopardy implications for other sovereigns.
But the binary choice this framework imposes-tribal sovereignty is ei-
ther inherent or not-has driven the Supreme Court to address its con-
210. See, e.g., United States v. Archambault, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017 n.4 (D.S.D.
2002) ("Congress is not able to delegate what it does not have, and because it does not
have the power to prosecute non-member Indians without affording them the full protec-
tion of the Constitution, it cannot in turn empower tribes to do this very thing."); United
States v. Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913, 914 (D. Neb. 1997) (holding interpreting
statute "as a delegation of congressional prosecutorial authority over nonmember Indians
would also concede that tribes would be exercising federal power, subject to the full pan-
oply of Constitutional rights").
211. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (arguing federal legislation may re-
lax constitutional preemption of state authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction within its
territory).
212. See supra note 199 (discussing congressional delegation of authority in Indian
country).
213. See supra notes 139-162 and accompanying text (noting deviation from federal
constitutional rights in territories).
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cerns about tribal extraconstitutional authority through curtailment of
tribes' control over nonmembers in their territory, a severe impediment
to what remains of their sovereignty.
It makes sense, therefore, to consider a different approach to resolv-
ing these open doctrinal questions, one that seeks descriptive adequacy
with respect to existing law, while also recognizing the concerns about
extraconstitutional authority that animate the Court's recent cases. Part
II turns to that inquiry.
II. DIVIDING SOVEREIGNTY
The remainder of this Article offers a preliminary sketch of a differ-
ent approach to the constitutional questions presented by state, territo-
rial, and tribal exercise of congressionally authorized criminal jurisdic-
tion. Specifically, this Article proposes retreating from the inherent
authority concept as an organizing principle and instead focusing on the
practical reality of divided sovereignty in these contexts. Recognizing the
interplay of federal and local authority at work in tribal and territorial
criminal jurisdiction permits an analysis focused on normative considera-
tions that support treating prosecutions as federal or nonfederal for pur-
poses of particular constitutional doctrines. On the three questions ad-
dressed here-the necessity of federal executive supervision, the applica-
tion of double jeopardy principles, and the applicability of particular Bill
of Rights guarantees-such an analysis may yield the most attractive reso-
lutions that are possible under current case law.
A. Presidential Control
On the first question-whether presidential control over enforce-
ment of federally authorized tribal, territorial, or state criminal law
should be required-the proper answer is "no," at least so long as a local,
and not federal, criminal prohibition is being enforced. As the summary
of current law above has shown, this is already at least the working as-
sumption of courts and legislatures, although the doctrinal explanation
has not been clearly articulated.214 Instead of attempting unique, and of-
ten strained, explanations in each context, courts should simply recog-
nize as a matter of doctrine what the cases and enactments implicitly
acknowledge: When Congress has exercised a recognized authority to
structure the jurisdiction of a subordinate government by conferring ef-
fectively autonomous powers of crime definition and enforcement on
that government, presidential control over resulting prosecutions should
not be constitutionally required, because the practical reasons for requir-
ing such control in the usual federal context are absent.
214. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.1 (summarizing existing law governing criminal juris-
diction of tribal and territorial governments).
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As noted earlier, the Supreme Court held in Printz v. United States
that the Constitution's assignment to the President of the responsibility
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"215 entails a require-
ment that execution of federal laws be subject to "meaningful
Presidential control."216 This requirement likely carries particular force
in the criminal context.217 This principle, and the related constitutional
requirement that executive officers must be appointed directly or indi-
rectly by the President, led Justice Thomas to muse in his Lara concur-
rence that tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers pursuant to the
Duro fix must be viewed as inherent rather than delegated. If it were del-
egated, he reasoned, then it would entail a "power to bring federal pros-
ecutions" that must be subject to some measure of presidential control."'
According to that view, however, state prosecutions pursuant to a
federal grant of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country would also re-
quire presidential control, at least if Congress's characterization of such
federal laws as delegations is accurate.21 9 By the same token, democratic
self-governance in the territories would also be impossible, as indeed two
scholars have recently suggested, because territorial authorities exercise
congressionally delegated federal power yet are not presidentially con-
trolled insofar as they are locally elected rather than federally ap-
pointed. 220
These conundrums disappear if we abandon the distinction between
inherent and delegated authority and recognize that in each of these
contexts, Congress has the power to structure the criminal jurisdiction
that subordinate governments may exercise as their own once it is feder-
ally authorized. The prohibitions enforced pursuant to such grants of
jurisdiction are not federal crimes but rather state, territorial, or tribal
crimes. Accordingly, there is no practical need for the President to "take
care" that these laws are properly enforced, as the Constitution's Take
Care Clause requires him to do with respect to federal laws. Quite the
215. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
216. 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997). For a more detailed discussion of the holding of
Pnintz, see supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
217. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("The power to bring federal prosecutions, which is part of the putative
delegated power, is manifestly and quintessentially executive power."); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (noting criminal "law enforcement functions ... typically have
been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch"). See generally Collins & Nash,
supra note 185, at 296-302 (discussing constitutional problems with "delegation of
prosecutorial power outside the executive branch").
218. Lara, 541 U.S. at 216.
219. See supra Part I.D (discussing deficiencies of inherency doctrine in federal-state
context).
220. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 136 (arguing elected territorial offi-
cials "cannot execute territorial laws, to the extent that the latter are also, for constitu-
tional purposes, laws of the United States").
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opposite, because the norms being enforced are those of the local com-
munity, enforcement discretion may be better exercised by local officials
accountable to the local community rather than by federal officials ac-
countable to the remote national President.22'
The Appointments Clause likewise should pose no obstacle. Indeed,
the Appointments Clause analysis advanced by Justice Thomas in Lara
and in some recent scholarship regarding the territories222 appears
inconsistent with courts' longstanding interpretation of this provision. By
its terms, the Clause is applicable only if an official qualifies as an
"Officer of the United States," and the Supreme Court has held that a
constitutional "office" requires not only "significant authority pursuant to
the laws of the United States"22 ' but also a "public station, or employ-
ment," in the federal government.224 As a practical matter, state, tribal,
and territorial officers satisfy neither of these prerequisites. Even if their
authority depends ultimately on federal authorization or acquiescence, it
is based principally on state, territorial, or tribal law. Moreover, their "sta-
tion" or "employment" is in a state, tribal, or territorial government, not
the federal government. In short, they are state, tribal, or territorial of-
ficers, not "Officers of the United States" within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause.225
The majority opinion in Lara offers support for this understanding
of Congress's authority. In Lara, the Court invoked historical precedents
from both tribal and territorial contexts to conclude that it was "not an
unusual legislative objective" for Congress "to modify the degree of au-
tonomy enjoyed by a dependent sovereign that is not a State."226 The
221. Cf. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 Mich. L.
Rev. 709, 725-38 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn, American Indians] (noting prosecutors'
discretion over which criminal violations to prosecute "has been normatively justified by
the premise that prosecutors take into account and indeed internalize the community's
values and mores in determining which cases to prosecute" but arguing federal prosecu-
tors fail to adequately represent affected communities in Indian country).
222. See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 131 (interpreting Appointments
Clause to cover territorial officers).
223. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148
(2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976) (per curiam)).
224. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867); see also United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1879) (discussing Hartwell and noting federal
authority is not enough to be considered officer of United States).
225. Courts have reached precisely this conclusion with respect to local government
officers of the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Pres. League,
648 F. Supp. 106, 116 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding authority exercised by locally elected City
Council of D.C., another self-governing entity subject to plenary congressional control, "is
not federal authority which must be performed by 'Officers of the United States'"
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2)), vacated on other grounds, No. 86-5630, 1987 WL
1367570 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 1987) (per curiam). See generally The Constitutional
Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 145-48 (1996)
(describing requirements of constitutional office).
226. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 203 (2004).
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Court further noted that Congress had historically exercised its "plenary"
authority over Indian affairs "to enact legislation that both restricts and,
in turn, relaxes ... restrictions on tribal sovereign authority."m22
With respect to criminal jurisdiction, this congressional authority to
expand and contract sovereign authority extends to states as well, given
Congress's constitutional authority to "alter [the] jurisdictional guide-
posts" separating state, federal, and tribal criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country.228 Similarly, in the territorial context, the Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress's authority under the Territory Clause entails
plenary power to select the "form of government" in the territory, with-
out regard to the "complex distribution of the powers of government"
prescribed for the federal government by the Constitution.22 1 Insofar as
these precedents recognize congressional authority to structure the ju-
risdiction exercised autonomously by subordinate state, tribal, or territo-
rial governments, they suggest that the necessity of federal authorizing
legislation for such jurisdiction does not mean that the resulting en-
forcement of state, territorial, or tribal law pursuant to such a federal
grant of jurisdiction constitutes execution of federal law for constitu-
tional purposes.
This view of Congress's power and its proper constitutional implica-
tions also draws support from case law in two related contexts. First,
based on the principle that the Appointments Clause restricts appoint-
ments only to federal "offices" characterized by a federal "station" or
"employment," courts have held (albeit not with complete uniformity)
that Congress may confer on nonfederal actors, such as state officials or
private parties, the authority to enforce federal laws through civil causes
of action without implicating any constitutional requirement of federal
supervision under the Appointments and Take Care Clauses.230 Given
that nonfederal officials thus may autonomously enforce federal law in
certain circumstances, it seems all the more clear that state, territorial,
and tribal governments should be free to enforce their own laws without
227. Id. at 202.
228. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993).
229. Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850).
230. See, e.g., Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conservation
Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding Appointments Clause
does not apply to Council members serving "pursuant to a compact which requires both
state legislation and congressional approval"); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 783, 796-97 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (holding
Wisconsin governor's role under federal statute "is neither significant enough to require
appointment as a federal officer nor exercised pursuant to the laws of the United States");
United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Eng'g, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 115, 120 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(holding qui tam plaintiffs do not violate Appointments Clause). See generally The
Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C.
at 145-46 ("[T]he simple assignment [to private individuals] of some duties under federal
law, even significant ones, does not by itself pose an Appointments Clause problem.").
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direct federal control, even if their authority to do so depends ultimately
on a grant ofjurisdiction from Congress.
Second, in Palmore v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
Congress may establish courts for enforcement of at least local criminal
laws in the District of Columbia without providing for the life tenure and
protection against salary reduction that Article III of the Constitution
requires for federal judges."' Drawing in part from the longstanding ac-
ceptance of non-Article III tribunals in other territories,232 the Court rea-
soned that "the requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws
of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must
in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of
power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment."2"3 The Court
thus concluded that in establishing a local court system for the District of
Columbia "with responsibility for trying and deciding those distinctively
local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal
laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction,"2 s4
Congress could provide for judges that, like their counterparts in many
states, do not enjoy the tenure and salary protections guaranteed to fed-
eral judges in Article III courts.235 The permissibility of territorial courts
that lack the structural guarantees of federal tribunals reinforces the
permissibility of enforcement mechanisms that likewise, at least with re-
spect to "local criminal laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local
jurisdiction," depart from structural requirements of presidential control
required for enforcement of national criminal prohibitions.
Recognizing that Congress may confer criminal jurisdiction on sub-
ordinate governments in certain contexts without needing federal execu-
tive supervision would also have another benefit. It would shift the focus
of the doctrinal inquiry away from the sterile distinction between inher-
ent and delegated authority and toward the more fundamental question
of how far Congress's jurisdiction-structuring authority should extend in
the first place. As a practical matter, requiring presidential supervision
would defeat the purpose of all such legislation, as enactments authoriz-
ing local criminal jurisdiction aim precisely to permit autonomous local
enforcement of local prohibitions. The key question, then, is to what ex-
tent Congress has the authority to confer such autonomous jurisdiction,
however the resulting local authority is characterized. In the territorial
and tribal contexts, as the Court recognized in Lara, longstanding prece-
dent supports broad congressional authority to expand or contract such
231. 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973); see also U.S. Const. art. III.
232. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (holding
Article III restrictions do not extend to territories).
233. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 407-08.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 409.
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jurisdiction.3 6 That authority, to be sure, may not be limitless. But where
Congress may properly exercise it to confer autonomous law enforce-
ment authority on subordinate governments, federal executive supervi-
sion of resulting prosecutions should not be constitutionally required.
B. Double Jeopardy
The question of whether state, tribal, or territorial prosecution
should bar separate federal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy
Clause largely parallels the question of whether presidential control of
enforcement is required. This question, too, presents a problem of divid-
ing sovereignty-an issue of when state, tribal, or territorial action should
be viewed as an emanation of federal rather than local authority for con-
stitutional purposes. Here, however, the Supreme Court's concept of in-
herent sovereignty has led it to view territorial governments differently
from state and tribal authorities.
Whereas the Supreme Court has characterized states and tribes as
possessing an independent sovereignty, the Court has held that territo-
ries, by virtue of exercising governmental power only by delegation from
Congress, lack separate sovereignty and therefore cannot enact and en-
force "offenses" distinct from identical federal crimes.23 ' Hence, double
jeopardy bars territorial, but not tribal, prosecution following federal
prosecution (and vice versa) for the same offense. Yet once one aban-
dons the emphasis on inherent sovereignty and views the issue in practi-
cal terms, it becomes clear-as the First Circuit has recognized with re-
spect to Puerto Rico 238-that the Supreme Court's governing decisions
on double jeopardy in the territorial context are anomalies ripe for re-
consideration. Territorial criminal prosecutions today reflect the vindica-
tion of an autonomous political community's values and interests. As
such, they should not preclude separate federal prosecution of the same
crimes.
Some have criticized the Court's "separate sovereignty" approach to
double jeopardy as, among other things, insufficiently protective of de-
fendants' liberty, inconsistent with the original understanding reflected
in eighteenth-century British practice (which treated foreign criminal
judgments as a bar to domestic prosecution), and out of step with the
general application of constitutional constraints on federal prosecution
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment."' These criticisms are cer-
236. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004).
237. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937).
238. United States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 42 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1987); United
States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164,1168 (1st Cir. 1987).
239. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After
Rodney King, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1995) (advocating reconceptualization of Double
Jeopardy Clause).
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tainly well founded insofar as the "separate sovereignty" approach makes
a central question affecting personal liberty-whether or not an individ-
ual defendant may be subject to repeat prosecution-turn on an abstract
inquiry into whether two distinct prosecuting governments within the
same polity have separate "sovereignty."
But the Court's approach can be justified in practical terms. First,
the "separate sovereigns" theory may make practical sense as a recogni-
tion that "separate political communities"" have distinct interests in re-
dressing offenses against fundamental values reflected in each commu-
nity's criminal code. Second, the "separate sovereigns" approach makes
sense on the understanding that autonomous enforcement decisions of
different communities reflect a judgment that separate punishment is
warranted to vindicate those separate interests. Thus, as the Supreme
Court itself emphasized in concluding that Indian tribes are separate
sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes, successive prosecutions by a
tribe or state and the federal government may be appropriate because
tribes and states have "a significant interest in maintaining orderly rela-
tions among their members" or citizens and in preserving their "customs
and traditions, apart from the federal interest in law and order" in the
reservation or state.241
On this understanding, the Supreme Court's decades-old holding
that territorial governments, as mere "'agenc[ies] of the federal govern-
ment,'" 42 are not separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes
should be discarded as rooted in a misguided formalism that no longer
reflects practical realities. At certain times in history, the degree of fed-
eral control over territorial executive officials, who until the 1950s and
1960s were federal appointees,24 3 was such that separate federal and
territorial prosecution might have seemed like an improper attempt by
authorities of one government to get two bites at the apple. But it makes
little sense to view successive prosecution in these terms today, given the
effective autonomy of territorial governments.244
240. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).
241. Id. at 331; see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) ("A State's interest
in vindicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by definition can
never be satisfied by another State's enforcement of its own laws.").
242. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 321 (quoting Domenech v. Nat'l City Bank, 294 U.S. 199,
204-05 (1935)).
243. See Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78
Calif. L. Rev. 853, 868-70 & nn.85-90 (1990) (summarizing changes and collecting sta-
tutes).
244. In the mid-nineteenth century, when all territories (except the District of
Columbia) were envisioned as future states, the Supreme Court described territorial gov-
ernments as separate "sovereigns" from the federal government, though it did not resolve
whether the federal government and a territorial government could separately prosecute
an individual for an identical offense. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13 (1852), which held:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territoy. He may be
said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an
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This conclusion seems particularly apt, as the First Circuit's Puerto
Rico decisions recognize, 245 with respect to the two commonwealth
territories, Puerto Rico and CNMI. These territories have locally enacted
constitutions that establish local governments comparable to those of the
states.4 In practical terms, however, two other organized territories,
Guam and the USVI, also are effectively autonomous with respect to
criminal enforcement.24 7 Congress, indeed, has authorized these two
territories to adopt local constitutions, though neither has yet done so.248
The hardest case is American Samoa, which has a local constitution and
locally elected governor and legislature but remains subject to the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior in certain respects.249 Here, too,
though, Samoan executive officials answer to local constituents, and the
federal government as a practical matter seems unlikely to attempt to
direct enforcement decisions.25
Two recent examples illustrate this point. First, in 2009, an off-duty
officer of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) in the USVI shot and killed a neighbor who was alleg-
edly intoxicated and threatening a former girlfriend.25' Although an
infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression
of the laws of both.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
245. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987)
("Puerto Rico is to be treated as a state for purposes of the double jeopardy clause.").
246. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b-731d (2006) (authorizing Puerto Rico to form a local
government pursuant to local constitution); id. § 1801 (approving Covenant To Establish a
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which establishes local government for
CNMI); see also P.R. Const.; N. Mar. I. Const.
247. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1424-4 (authorizing government of Guam to establish
Office of the Public Prosecutor and designating Attorney General of Guam as chief law
enforcement officer); id. §§ 1571-1613a (granting USVI government power to amend,
alter, modify, or repeal any criminal law).
248. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
249. Under the American Samoan Constitution, which may not be altered without
Congress's consent, 48 U.S.C. § 1662a, the legislature may pass laws over the Governor's
veto only with the Secretary's consent, the Secretary continues to appoint the ChiefJustice
and Associate Justice of the American Samoan High Court, and the Secretary may overrule
decisions of the High Court's appellate division (although the Secretary has apparently
never exercised this authority). Revised Const. of Am. Sam., available at
http://www.house.gov/faleomavaega/samoan-constitution.shtml (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). See generally Laughlin, Territories and
Affiliated Jurisdictions, supra note 16, at 296-98 (discussing American Samoan
Constitution); Uilisone Falemanu Tua, A Native's Call for Justice: The Call for the
Establishment of a Federal District Court in American Samoa, 11 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol'y J.
246, 271-74 (2009) (same).
250. See infra notes 253-255 and accompanying text for an example of apparently in-
dependent prosecutorial decisionmaking by federal authorities in American Samoa.




internal ATF investigation exonerated the officer, the locally elected
USVI Attorney General pressed criminal homicide charges against him.
Even after ATF protested the prosecution by withdrawing all of its offic-
ers from the islands, the local prosecutor continued to pursue the case
until a local trial court dismissed the charges. 2 In contrast, a federal
prosecutor would have been bound to apply federal policy. A govern-
ment exercising this degree of autonomy from federal interests in its
criminal charging decisions is effectively a "separate political community"
with separate interests that may be vindicated through successive crimi-
nal prosecution.
Second, in 2001, federal authorities successfully prosecuted one of
the largest human trafficking cases in history against a businessman who
allegedly coerced women from China, Vietnam, and American Samoa to
work in brutal sweatshops in American Samoa.25 ' The federal govern-
ment brought the case in Hawaii, because no federal district court has
jurisdiction over American Samoa. 54 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ex-
pressed bewilderment at the failure of Samoan authorities to prosecute
any crime.255 The case illustrates, however, how there could have been a
powerful separate federal interest in prosecution, even if there had been
a local criminal action against the defendant. Human trafficking may
implicate considerations of foreign policy and civil rights protection that
are particular concerns of the national government. Such considerations
might well have justified separate federal punishment following a local
prosecution, particularly if the Samoan trial resulted in acquittal or if the
defendant received a sentence far below federal guidelines.
In sum, the Supreme Court should reorient its double jeopardy doc-
trine toward the practical considerations underlying its separate sover-
eignty test. It should recognize that territorial prosecutions, no less than
those of states or tribes, reflect a local decision to enforce local law. Dou-
ble jeopardy principles therefore should not bar successive prosecution
of an identical crime by territorial authorities before or after a federal
prosecution.
252. See Joy Blackburn, Judge Issues Ruling Formally Dismissing Case Against ATF
Agent, V.I. Daily News, Nov. 6, 2010, at 3, available at http://virginislandsdailynews.com/
judge-issues-ruling-formally-dismissing-case-against-atf-agent-1.1060450 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Joy Blackburn, Senators Table Bill To Allow Federal Agents To
Enforce Local Law, V.I. Daily News, Apr. 27, 2011, at 4, available at
http://vrginislandsdailynews.com/news/senators-table-bill-to-allow-federal-agents-to-enforce-
local-law-1. 1138147 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
253. United States v. Lee, 472 F.3d 638, 639-41 (9th Cir. 2006). For further back-
ground on the case, see Adam C. Clanton, How To Transfer Venue When You Only Have
One: The Problem of High Profile Criminal Jury Trials in American Samoa, 29 U. Haw. L.
Rev. 325, 365-66 (2007).
254. Lee, 472 F.3d at 640-41.





The most fraught issue presented by tribal and territorial criminal
jurisdiction is the question of procedural rights. Longstanding deci-
sions-the Insular Cases for the territories and Talton for Indian tribes-
indicate that tribal and territorial governments may impose criminal
punishment in at least some cases without adhering to constitutionally
derived rules of criminal procedure.25' But the Supreme Court has unset-
tled the law in both areas by showing hostility to such exceptionalism.
After Boumediene and Lara, the case law presents a set of parallel
open questions with respect to procedural requirements in prosecutions
by territorial and tribal governments. With respect to territorial govern-
ments, the open questions are: (1) Do the Insular Cases remain good law
in the five major territories? (2) To the extent those cases remain good
law, what deviations from Bill of Rights requirements are permissible,
and how is their permissibility to be determined? With respect to tribal
governments, similarly, the open questions are: (1) Does Talton's holding
that tribes are not bound by the Constitution remain good law with re-
spect to criminal prosecutions of nonmember Indians pursuant to the
Duro fix or of non-Indians pursuant to the new Oliphant fix? (2) To the
extent Talton is not good law and the Constitution applies in such prose-
cutions, are any deviations from the Bill of Rights permissible, and how is
their permissibility to be determined?
The distinction between inherent and delegated authority criticized
throughout this Article offers one framework for answering these ques-
tions. The effect of this framework would be to treat the two contexts-
territories and tribes-quite differently, notwithstanding their practical
similarities. On this view, because territorial governments derive all their
authority from Congress, territorial prosecutions would need to abide by
all criminal procedure requirements of the Bill of Rights, including the
Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury indictment, at least insofar
as those requirements apply to action by the federal government in the
territory. In contrast, this framework would imply that the Constitution is
entirely inapplicable to Indian tribes when they exercise inherent crimi-
nal jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction over nonmember Indians or
non-Indians restored by the Duro and Oliphant fixes. 57
256. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text (discussing Insular Cases); supra
notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing Talton).
257. Like the Durv fix, the new Oliphant fix purports to restore inherent tribal sover-
eignty. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (as amended by VAWA, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, § 904,
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s47enr/pdf/BILLS-113s47enr.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review)). Although in Lara the Supreme Court accepted
this characterization of the Duro fix (at least for double jeopardy purposes), United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004), it remains an open question whether the Court will
consider it constitutional to restore inherent tribal jurisdiction with respect to non-Indians
covered by the Oliphant fix. The analysis here generally presumes that the Oliphant fix
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This pattern of results is neither descriptively nor normatively satisfy-
ing. Applying all Bill of Rights requirements to prosecutions by territorial
governments would disrupt settled expectations in some territories. And
while the complete absence of constitutional regulation of tribal prosecu-
tions of nonmembers may be appealing to proponents of tribal sover-
eignty, that result would be inconsistent with the concerns about consti-
tutionally unregulated governmental authority that the Court expressed
in cases such as Oliphant, Duro, and Boumediene. Meanwhile, as this Article
has shown, the inherent authority framework has difficulty explaining
the treatment of state exercises of federally delegated criminal jurisdic-
tion in Indian country as state, rather than federal, action for constitu-
tional purposes.258
At the other extreme, a second possible approach would be to deem
the entire Bill of Rights applicable to all congressionally authorized pros-
ecutions by tribal or territorial governments. On this view, it would
simply be impermissible, as a matter of constitutional law, to allow consti-
tutionally unregulated criminal prosecution within the sovereign terri-
tory of the United States. As delegates of Congress's "plenary" power over
the territories, territorial governments would be bound by criminal pro-
cedure requirements of the Bill of Rights,just as the federal government
is. Similarly, Congress would be barred from exercising its plenary power
over Indian tribes to authorize prosecutions by tribal governments that
violate constitutional norms (except perhaps when tribal membership
provides a robust consent basis for following unusual procedures).25 9
This view would take the Court's recent decisions to their logical
limit. In effect, it would extend to Indian country and the territories the
trend toward homogenization of constitutional norms reflected in
Supreme Court decisions from recent decades holding that the
validly restores inherent tribal jurisdiction, so that these two statutes present parallel
constitutional questions with respect to criminal procedure. As indicated at the end of this
subsection, the framework for resolving criminal procedure questions advocated here
might in fact strengthen the case for the Oliphant fix's constitutionality.
258. See supra notes 205-209 and accompanying text (discussing conceptual diffi-
culty of reaching this conclusion where federal statutes delegate criminal jurisdiction to
states).
259. For an argument that the Bill of Rights should apply fully in tribal courts be-
cause "Congress has engaged in a course of legislative conduct with respect to Indian na-
tions and Indian tribes that has resulted in the complete defeasance of retained tribal
power and retained sovereignty," see James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United
States Applies to Indian Tribes, 59 Mont. L. Rev. 51, 53 (1998). A half-century ago, some
courts took the view that at least some courts were effectively federal instrumentalities for
constitutional purposes. See, e.g., Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 379 (9th Cir. 1965)
(concluding in some circumstances "courts function in part as a federal agency and in part
as a tribal agency, and that consequently it is competent for a federal court in a habeas
corpus proceeding to inquire into the legality of the detention of an Indian pursuant to an
order of an Indian court"). The Supreme Court repudiated this position in United States v.
Wheeler, which held that tribes' criminal jurisdiction is an attribute of retained inherent
sovereignty. 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
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Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause imposes on states nearly all
requirements of the Bill of Rights (which directly applies only to the fed-
eral government) .2W Some scholars have criticized this approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that it reflects a failure of imagination
that has unduly constrained states' flexibility to experiment with alterna-
tive procedures.'61 Whatever the merits of this view with respect to
states-a question beyond the scope of this Article-there may be dis-
tinct, and particularly compelling, normative reasons to accommodate
different procedural traditions in the tribal and territorial contexts. The
territories, after all, are not even permanently joined to the United
States, and Indian tribes possess a sovereignty that long predates the
Constitution. Furthermore, both sets of communities have traditions dis-
tinct from Anglo-American norms. Adherence to these distinct norms
may be important not only to the cultural identity of these communities,
but also to the public legitimacy of tribal and territorial prosecutions in
the affected communities.26 2
It is worth considering, therefore, whether any intermediate course
is possible. Could a sound constitutional analysis preserve room for ac-
commodation of local procedural traditions while also maintaining ade-
quate constitutional regulation of tribal and territorial prosecutions? In
fact, as the following discussion will argue, an approach that allows lim-
ited deviations from Bill of Rights requirements to accommodate local
traditions has both normative appeal and substantial support in the case
law to date, particularly if state, tribal, and territorial contexts are consid-
ered in parallel.
1. Federal-State Analogies. - The federal-state context provides a use-
ful starting point for the analysis. Historic case law regarding Fourteenth
Amendment due process provides one model for accommodating dis-
tinct procedural traditions of tribal or territorial communities. The
Supreme Court today favors near-complete incorporation of Bill of
260. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text; infra note 263 and accompany-
ing text.
261. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 215,
216 (2003) (highlighting costs of Court's shift toward focus "on the individual offender
and his relationship to the Bill of Rights, often to the exclusion of the public's perception
of the fairness of the criminal justice system's operation"); see also infra note 305 (discuss-
ing experimentation with jury nonunanimity permitted by Supreme Court decision).
262. See, e.g., Raymond D. Austin, Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law: A
Tradition of Tribal Self-Governance 109 (2009) (explaining that although "Navajo culture
accords individual rights and freedoms great respect," the "Navajo perception of individ-
ual rights differs dramatically from the Anglo-American view of these rights"); Carole E.
Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 Ariz. St. L.J. 889, 901 (2003)
[hereinafter Goldberg, Tribal Revitalization] (discussing arguments that imposition of an




Rights requirements into Fourteenth Amendment due process.263 But in
older cases such as Palko v. Connecticut, the Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause more flexibly, evaluating each particu-
lar requirement of the Bill of Rights on its own merits and applying it to
states only if the Court believed that "a fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without [it]." Despite their later repudia-
tion, cases from the Palko-era show that a less automatic approach to ap-
plying federal constitutional requirements in local prosecutions is at least
conceptually possible.
Indeed, outside the criminal context, context-specific judgments
about procedural requirements are the norm. Under the familiar
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the process due in a particular pro-
ceeding depends on weighing the "private interest that will be affected by
the official action," the "risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used," and "the Government's interest, includ-
ing the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,"26'
This approach may well yield different procedural requirements in dif-
ferent tribunals .21 By the same token, a Palko-like approach to due pro-
cess might yield different procedures for tribal and territorial courts than
for federal and state courts.
A second line of cases might provide a more concrete framework for
evaluating particular tribal and territorial practices. In decisions address-
ing the so-called "reverse-Eie" problem-the question of when federal
(rather than state) procedures should attend the adjudication of federal
substantive claims in state court16 -the Supreme Court has held that
federal law typically "'takes state courts as it finds them."'2 In other
words, state procedures are presumptively adequate for the adjudication
of federal claims, even when those procedures depart from constitutional
requirements that would apply in federal court. At the same time, the
Court has held in a handful of cases that state courts are obliged to apply
federal procedures, either because those procedures are "'part and par-
263. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-35 nn.12-13 (2010) (re-
viewing Court's incorporation decisions).
264. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
265. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
266. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532-33 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(applying Mathews balancing test to procedures for military detention of enemy combat-
ants).
267. The doctrine of these cases is referred to as "reverse-Erie" because the question it
addresses-when federal procedures apply in state court-is in some sense the reverse of
the question of when state substantive law applies in federal court, which was famously
addressed in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
268. E.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997) (quoting Howelett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)).
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cel"' of the federal substantive right being adjudicated, 6' or because the
state procedures would unnecessarily burden federal rights or produce
systematic differences in outcome in similar cases adjudicated in state
rather than federal court.270
In a compelling recent distillation of the case law in this area, Kevin
Clermont argues that reverse-Eie cases are best explained as balancing
state and federal interests and forum-shopping concerns to determine
whether state or federal procedural law should apply.271 According to this
view, courts considering a reverse-Erie question must "balance the state's
interest in having its legal rule applied in state court on this issue in this
case against the federal interests in having federal law displace the rule of
this particular state, while trying to avoid differences in outcome."272
Tribal or territorial court adjudication of tribal or territorial crimi-
nal offenses is of course distinguishable in many respects from the
reverse-Eyie situation.273 But tribal and territorial court adjudication does
parallel the reverse-Erie problem in that both situations involve questions
about the adequacy of local, rather than federal, procedures for adjudi-
cation of claims or offenses pursuant to a federal grant of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the reverse-Erie balancing test might provide a principled
framework for considering whether to accommodate tribal or territorial
procedural norms that depart from Bill of Rights requirements. Here,
given that the federal interests at stake are the individual liberty interests
protected by the Bill of Rights, this framework yields a balancing stand-
ard reminiscent of the general Mathews v. Eldidge test for procedural due
process. Specifically, the test would weigh individual liberty interests
against the tribal or territorial community's interest in maintaining its
traditional procedure, with a particular emphasis on avoiding systematic
differences in outcome or the fundamental fairness of proceedings.
As will be demonstrated, lower courts already employ a similar bal-
ancing analysis to assess both tribal and territorial procedures in certain
contexts.274 Furthermore, the reverse-Erie balance might explain the
269. Dice v. Akron, 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co., 319
U.S. 350, 354 (1943)).
270. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (finding state notice-of-claim
rule preempted because it "will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in
§ 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court").
271. Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Eie, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 33 (2006).
272. Id.
273. For example, tribal or territorial court adjudication involves trial of a local of-
fense, whereas the reverse-Erie problem arises from state court adjudication of a federal
claim. Also, state courts are presumptively adequate for adjudication of federal claims,
whereas tribal and territorial courts are not. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366-
67 (2001) (discussing "historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court
jurisdiction over federal-law cases" and distinguishing tribal courts).
274. See infra notes 288-298 (discussing D.C. and Ninth Circuit decisions adopting
balancing approach to tribal and territorial procedures).
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inapplicability of unincorporated elements of the Bill of Rights in state
prosecutions pursuant to a federal delegation of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country. Such prosecutions, too, present a rough analogy to the
reverse-Erie problem insofar as they require adjudication in state court of
criminal prohibitions imposed pursuant to a federal grant ofjurisdiction.
But the state interest in adhering to usual state procedures is especially
compelling given that state substantive law is being enforced. Hence, the
interests served by requiring grand jury indictment, for example, might
seem slight compared to the disruption caused by departing from usual
state charging practices, and there would appear to be little risk of a sys-
tematic difference in outcomes if such state procedures were followed.
Likewise, while it might present a closer question, requiring jury unanim-
ity where states do not otherwise require it might not be sufficiently ben-
eficial to defendants, or produce a sufficiently likely difference in out-
come, to justify the disruption to usual state procedure that such a re-
quirement in Indian country cases would cause.
Insofar as a balancing standard may help explain the otherwise mys-
terious pattern of results in state prosecutions in Indian country, this
standard may provide an important backdrop for examination of the
more challenging questions presented by territorial and tribal contexts.
2. Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction. - Whereas the federal-state context
today presents the choice between two ready-made sets of procedural
rights-the full Bill of Rights or the slightly smaller set of rights incorpo-
rated into Fourteenth Amendment due process-the territorial context
presents the question of whether any broader procedural variation is
possible in the territories. Nevertheless, the framework suggested by
Palko, Mathews v. Eldridge, and the reverse-Eie cases might provide a
model for accommodating local criminal procedure traditions in the ter-
ritorial setting in a principled fashion.
In Boumediene, as discussed above, the Court interpreted the Insular
Cases to require a pragmatic, context-dependent approach to extraterri-
torial application of the Constitution. 75 Such a context-specific analysis
of the territorial setting should begin with recognition that territorial
criminal jurisdiction presents a problem of dividing sovereignty. As dis-
cussed above, territorial governments today provide a form of substitute
federalism for territorial communities. That is, while formally exercising
congressionally delegated federal power, local territorial governments
are by and large locally elected and locally controlled and address local
governmental needs, subject to overarching federal law, much like state
governments. 176
275. See supra notes 173-178 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning and
holding of Boumediene).




From this perspective, although extraterritoriality provides the doc-
trinal justification for departing from federal constitutional requirements
in the territorial context, framing the doctrine in such terms only dis-
tracts from the practical interests at stake. Much like states, the major
unincorporated territories at this point are effectively part of the United
States; at the least, they are subject to complete U.S. sovereignty unless
and until Congress, at its discretion, provides statehood or independence
(whether through a plebiscite or some other means).
The situation in the territories thus differs in important ways from
other contexts where questions regarding the "extraterritorial" applica-
tion of the Constitution have arisen. Unlike in overseas military bases,
war zones, or even Guantanamo Bay, there is no foreign state that can
claim sovereignty in U.S. territories, nor any diplomatic context or limita-
tions on U.S. authority that may make compliance with constitutional
procedural guarantees impracticable. Indeed, for these very reasons, crit-
ics have long argued that the imperfect application of constitutional
guarantees in the territories under the Insular Cases is a discriminatory
anomaly ripe for overruling."' At the same time, however, unincorpo-
rated territories may hold uniquely compelling claims to maintaining
cultural and political norms that depart from federal constitutional re-
quirements. The United States could relinquish sovereignty over these
territories (even if for the moment it appears unlikely to do so). In most
cases, local populations never consented to U.S. sovereignty, and territo-
rial populations lack effective representation in the federal government
(even U.S. citizens domiciled in insular territories cannot vote in presi-
dential elections or for voting members of Congress278). Even some crit-
ics of the Insular Cases have therefore found it normatively attractive to
preserve some local traditions that conflict with usual constitutional re-
quirements.279
Federal-state analogues may therefore provide a more fruitful basis
than other extraterritorial contexts for considering what criminal proce-
dure guarantees apply in the territories. The federal government itself
may of course enforce federal criminal laws in the territories, just as it
does in states. When it does so, given the long duration of federal control
over the current U.S. territories, there would seem to be no persuasive
277. See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine
of Separate and Unequal 268 (1985) (noting "all the underpinnings of the Insular Cases
have been removed").
278. See supra note 17.
279. Dean Aleinikoff, for example, argues that a "thorough repudiation" of the
Insular Cases would, given their "provenance," "mark the triumph of constitutionalism over
racism," yet he also observes that "[t]here is an important difference between denying
rights to a people based on assumptions of their inferiority and taking into account in the
definition of rights the considered judgments of a people interested in preserving their
political and cultural distinctiveness." Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 84-85.
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justification for deeming Bill of Rights requirements inapplicable. In-
deed, apart from the unusual use of grand juries in the USVI described
above,280 normal federal criminal procedures generally are applicable in
federal prosecutions in the major territories. 2s' Enforcement of local
territorial law by local territorial authorities, however, implicates consid-
erations of local procedural autonomy similar to those that arise when
Congress confers criminal jurisdiction on states.
Indeed, territorial governments exercising federally conferred crim-
inal jurisdiction closely resemble state governments exercising federally
derived criminal jurisdiction. Though formally all sovereignty over unin-
corporated territories is vested in Congress under the Territory Clause,
organic legislation enabling democratic territorial self-governance re-
sembles legislation removing statutory or constitutional preemption of
local law in the federal-state context.28 2 Much like legislation relaxing the
dormant Commerce Clause or authorizing state criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country,28 3 these acts of Congress relax the restrictions that U.S.
sovereignty places on local self-governance; such statutes, in other words,
permit the territorial population to exercise governmental authority that
would otherwise fall to Congress.
Accordingly, it makes sense to apply the same framework in the ter-
ritorial context that the reverse-Eie cases suggest may apply in related
federal-state contexts: a weighing of individual liberty interests against
local autonomy interests, with a particular emphasis on avoiding system-
atic differences in outcome or the fundamental fairness of proceedings
based on whether a defendant happens to be prosecuted by territorial
authorities (who exercise federal power indirectly) or by the federal gov-
ernment itself (which exercises federal power directly).
Such an approach is consistent with Boumediene's treatment of the
Insular Cases. In Boumediene, the Court emphasized accommodation of
civil law traditions as the rationale for the Insular Cases284-a view that
seems to recognize the presence of a contrary indigenous tradition as the
sole reason for departing from usual constitutional norms in the territo-
280. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text (explaining grand jury indict-
ments are optional for federal crimes charged in USVI federal court); infra notes 307-308
and accompanying text (discussing disuse of grand jury indictments for criminal charges
in USVI).
281. See supra note 145 (describing bill of rights in Guam and USVI).
282. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's plenary
authority to select territory's form of government under Territory Clause).
283. See supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text (discussing dormant
Commerce Clause and federal legislation that confers state jurisdiction over crimes in
Indian country).
284. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 726, 757 (2008) ("[T]he former Spanish
colonies operated under a civil-law system . . . . The Court thus was reluctant to risk the
uncertainty ... that could result from a rule that displaced ... existing legal systems in
these newly acquired Territories.").
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rial setting. Furthermore, as Judge Jos6 Cabranes has observed, avoid-
ance of "irreparable injustice" has often been an important factor in
cases addressing the extraterritorial applicability of constitutional
rights.285 Hence, for example, Justice Harlan concluded in Reid that
greater procedural protections should be afforded to capital defendants
than to noncapital defendants, 8 6 and in Boumediene the Court ensured
the availability of habeas relief in part as a means of mitigating, in Judge
Cabranes's words, the "risk of indefinite erroneous detention at the mili-
tary base at Guantanamo Bay."28 ' By the same token, in the territorial set-
ting, the likely impact of a procedural variation on trial outcomes and
fundamental fairness should be an important factor in the analysis.
Lower court decisions from the decades before Boumediene, though
not entirely consistent in their approach, support such an emphasis on
protecting individual liberty while also accommodating cultural and po-
litical autonomy. In King v. Morton, a case that addressed the necessity of
jury trials in American Samoa, the D.C. Circuit mandated a context-
specific inquiry similar to the one Justice Harlan proposed in his concur-
ring opinion in Reid.2"8 Rejecting the view that the Insular Cases estab-
lished that jury rights are nonfundamental and therefore are simply op-
tional in unincorporated territories, the court held that the "importance
of the constitutional right at stake" necessitated an analysis based on "a
solid understanding of the present legal and cultural development of
American Samoa."289 The court therefore remanded the case for a
factual inquiry into such factors as
whether the Samoan mores and matai culture with its strict soci-
etal distinctions will accommodate a jury system in which a de-
fendant is tried before his peers; whether a jury in Samoa could
fairly determine the facts of a case in accordance with the in-
structions of the court without being unduly influenced by cus-
toms and traditions of which the criminal law takes no notice;
and whether the implementation of a jury system would be
practicable.29
On remand, the district court conducted extensive factfinding on cul-
tural and political conditions in American Samoa and concluded that
285. See Jose A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 Yale L.J. 1660, 1704-06 (2009)
(discussing case law demonstrating "[c]onstraints set forth by the Constitution on the
power of the government are more likely to be enforced when the risk of irreparable injus-
tice is high").
286. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan,J., concurring).
287. Cabranes, supra note 285, at 1705 (discussing Boumediene).
288. See King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[Tlhe question is
whether in American Samoa 'circumstances are such that trial byjury would be impractical
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jury trials would not be "impractical and anomalous" under the circum-
stances.29'
Several years later, in Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, the Ninth
Circuit rejected a similar challenge to the limited availability of criminal
jury trials in CNMI without requiring or attempting any such extensive
factfinding." 2 In the Ninth Circuit's view, Reid required no change to the
"fundamental rights" analysis of the Insular Cases." The court consid-
ered itself bound by the holding in those cases "that the Fifth
Amendment right to grand jury indictment and the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury are nonfundamental rights that do not apply in un-
incorporated territories."294 And while the court, like the district and cir-
cuit courts in the King litigation, emphasized cultural autonomy as the
proper rationale for procedural flexibility in the territories, it deferred to
Congress's judgment that the context in CNMI made jury trial inappro-
priate. The court explained:
The Insular Cases acknowledged that traditional Anglo-
American procedures such as jury trial might be inappropriate
in territories having cultures, traditions and institutions differ-
ent from our own .... This approach allowed the Court to af-
ford Congress flexibility in administering offshore territories
and to avoid imposition of the jury system on peoples unaccus-
tomed to common law traditions. 295
If usual Fifth and Sixth Amendment standards applied inflexibly in such
territories, the Ninth Circuit observed, "[a]ccomodation of the particular
social and cultural conditions of areas such as the NMI would be difficult
if not impossible."296
In a later decision, the Ninth Circuit characterized the D.C. Circuit's
approach in King v. Morton as "consistent with the principles we stressed
in Atalig" and invoked King's application ofJustice Harlan's "impractical
and anomalous" test as a basis for upholding ancestry-based restrictions
on land ownership in CNMI that almost certainly would violate constitu-
tional equal protection requirements as applied on the mainland.297
Even in applying this test, however, the court did not require specific
factfinding regarding the cultural context but instead took judicial notice
291. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1977).
292. 723 F.2d 682, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1984).
293. See id. at 689 & n.22, 690 n.25 ("[W]e believe that ... Reid [did] not modify the
holding of the Insular Cases concerning trial by jury.").
294. Id. at 688.
295. Id. at 690.
296. Id.
297. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting while
argument that restrictive covenant failed to be narrowly tailored "would have substantial
force in an equal protection analysis . . . it is of only minimal relevance to the threshold




that "native ownership of land" plays a "vital role ... in the preservation
of NMI social and cultural stability" and emphasized that acceptance of
these ownership restrictions was critical to the formation of the political
union between CNMI and the United States.298
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits thus conflict over whether the Insular
Cases simply make optional "nonfundamental" rights such as the right to
jury trial or instead require a context-specific inquiry into the practicabil-
ity of implementing the right in a particular territory. Yet both courts
anticipated Boumediene in recognizing cultural autonomy as the sole per-
suasive rationale for the Insular Cases doctrine, as applied in the territo-
rial setting. After Boumediene, the correct approach should fall between
the Ninth and D.C. Circuit approaches. While Boumediene resolves the
split between these courts in favor of a context-specific inquiry, its em-
phasis on accommodation of civil law traditions as the rationale for the
Insular Cases supports assigning greater weight to the territorial prefer-
ence for preserving indigenous procedural traditions than the D.C.
Circuit did.29 The proper inquiry, in other words, should not be simply
whether implementation of particular rights would be feasible under the
circumstances. Courts, rather, should focus on whether the benefit of the
right to individual liberty is sufficiently substantial to justify the disrup-
tion of traditional procedural institutions and, relatedly, whether territo-
rial institutions are sufficiently fair that the denial of the right will not
produce systematically different outcomes in individual cases.oo
298. Id. at 1461.
299. See, e.g., United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1981) (describing
Insular Cases as "reason [ing] that the United States, in acquiring [unincorporated] posses-
sions, did not intend to supplant indigenous procedural rules which had developed to
enforce local substantive norms"); cf. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478
U.S. 328, 339 n.6 (1986) ("A rigid rule of deference to interpretations of Puerto Rico law
by Puerto Rico courts is particularly appropriate given the unique cultural and legal his-
tory of Puerto Rico.").
300. Cf. Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 87 (arguing courts reviewing territorial practices
"ought to examine the centrality of the challenged practice to the particular values of self-
determination and cultural autonomy being asserted, against the backdrop of evolving
norms of international human rights"); Laughlin, Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions,
supra note 16, at 165-81 (advocating understanding of "impractical or anomalous" test
under which "the importance of a particular right to the individual before the court" and
"the impact on indigenous culture" are important factors); Gerald L. Neuman,
Understanding Global Due Process, 23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 365, 392 (2009) (suggesting "im-
practicable or anomalous" test might depend in part on whether "a right [is] culturally
anomalous because of its incongruity with local customs").
Robert Katz proposed, before Boumediene, that the split in approach between the
Ninth and D.C. Circuits could be explained by the different "legitimizing principles" avail-
able in the two territories at issue: Because American Samoa lacks an organized territorial
government and thus formally remains subject to governance by the Secretary of the
Interior, Katz suggested, U.S. authority could best be legitimated there on a theory of "lib-
eral constitutionalism," under which U.S. authority is legitimated by strict adherence to
constitutional norms and the rule of law, whereas in CNMI, which accepted U.S. sover-
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This understanding of Insular Cases doctrine would place CNMI's
unusual jury practice on solid constitutional footing. As Boumediene rec-
ognized, the heightened autonomy interests of unincorporated territo-
ries may justify broader procedural flexibility for territorial courts than
state courts.s0' The case for such variation seems particularly strong with
respect to CNMI, which accepted U.S. sovereignty through a democratic
process and insisted on local control over jury rights in territorial prose-
cutions as a precondition for its union with the United States. 02 Even in
the federal-state context, in Duncan v. Louisiana-a seminal decision in-
corporating Sixth Amendment jury trial rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause-the Supreme Court recognized that a
procedural system without jury trials may be fundamentally fair.303 Pro-
vided that CNMI courts otherwise fit that description, it seems reasonable
to suppose that the local interest in maintaining traditional non-jury
forms of criminal justice might outweigh the interests supporting adher-
ence to Sixth Amendment jury-trial requirements in territorial prosecu-
tions. 304
eignty through a democratic process, deference to CNMI's democratic preference for trial
without juries better legitimated U.S. rule. Robert A. Katz, Note, The Jurisprudence of
Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to U.S. Territories, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 779 (1992).
Katz, therefore, proposed either leaving the circuit split in place or formally recognizing a
differential approach based on different legitimating principles appropriate in each terri-
tory. Id. at 803-04. Katz's proposal overlooks the facts that American Samoa's jury practice
was also evidently supported by democratic preferences, as the district court recognized in
King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1977), and thatjudicial imposition of alien norms
may only add insult to injury in a territory already subject to federal executive branch con-
trol.
301. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008).
302. See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text (explaining there is no right to
jury trial in all criminal prosecutions in CNMI).
303. 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) ("A criminal process which was fair and equitable
but used no juries is easy to imagine.").
304. Some have argued that CNMI, because it accepted U.S. sovereignty through a
"covenant" with the United States, is not a "territory" at all but is instead linked to the
United States only by treaty. See, e.g., Joseph E. Horey, The Right of Self-Government in
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 4 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol'y J. 180, 203-
05 (2003) (arguing formation of covenant was exercise of federal government's authority
to enter treaties, not Congress's power under Territory Clause). This view is arguably in-
consistent with the covenant's plain terms and has been questioned by other scholars.
Even if valid, however, it would only strengthen the conclusion that CNMI's jury proce-
dures satisfy any applicable requirements of the U.S. Constitution. See 48 U.S.C. § 1801
note (2006) (Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America § 101) (establishing commonwealth "in
political union with and under the sovereignty of the United States of America");
Laughlin, Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions, supra note 16, at 432-35 (describing
covenant's own Supremacy Clause "which mentions the Covenant first 'together with those
provisions of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States applicable to the
Northern Mariana Islands' as the supreme laws" of the islands); Burnett, Convenient
Constitution, supra note 6, at 1037 n.216 (discussing split opinion on whether CNMI is
unincorporated territory of United States or separate sovereign associated with United
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Viewing the issue in these terms also helps to rationalize Congress's
general practice of extending to the territories by statute only those con-
stitutional criminal procedure rights applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Given that territorial governments, unlike
states, formally exercise federal power conferred by Congress, the
Fourteenth Amendment is not directly applicable to them. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court's judgment that certain rights are not crucial even
for state criminal justice systems lends support to the view that those
same rights can also be dispensed with in the territorial context.0 5 Per-
haps for that reason, the Supreme Court has suggested cryptically in sev-
eral cases that Fourteenth Amendment standards, rather than the Bill of
Rights, may be the proper constitutional baseline for assessing territorial
governments' actions. 0'
States via mutually binding covenant); cf. Keitner & Reisman, supra note 152, at 42
(characterizing United States authority over CNMI as falling "somewhere in-between"
treaty-based authority and plenary control).
305. Justice Powell's concurrence in the companion cases Apodaca and johnson, which
was crucial to the Court's holding that the Fourteenth Amendment permits nonunani-
mous jury verdicts in state courts (because the Court produced no majority opinion), em-
ployed a balancing standard of sorts. Powell's concurrence indicated that rigid application
of all Sixth Amendment requirements to the states would "derogate[] principles of feder-
alism that are basic to our system [of justice]," because states should have "freedom to
experiment with adjudicatory processes different from the federal model." Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). Christina Duffy Burnett has pointed to Justice
Powell's opinion as a model for proper application of the Constitution in the territories
(and in extraterritorial contexts generally). See Burnett, Convenient Constitution, supra
note 6, at 1028-30 ("Powell's more flexible approach ... closely anchors itself in the con-
stitutional text and in doctrinal developments that provide more substantial guidance to
courts than a generalized notion of fairness . . . could ever do."). Burnett argues that the
Constitution should be flexible with respect to "how" it applies outside the fifty states and
District of Columbia but not as to "whether" it does so. Id. at 978, 1031-32. This distinc-
tion seems partially semantic-questions of "how" the Constitution applies in particular
contexts (for example, does it apply so as to require jury unanimity?) can be recast in
terms of "whether" particular guarantees are applicable (for example, is there a right to
jury unanimity?). But her basic approach of allowing limited exceptions to usual constitu-
tional requirements seems similar to the approach advocated here in the territorial con-
text. Cf. id. at 1037-39 (analyzing equal protection questions presented by landholding
restrictions in CNMI).
306. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 572, 600-02 (1976); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
668 n.5 (1974). In these cases, the Court reserved judgment as to whether certain constitu-
tional rights applied to Puerto Rico by virtue of the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments.
Given the federal character of territorial authority and the Fourteenth Amendment's ex-
press applicability only to "States," the suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to the territories seems conceptually confused, except insofar as the Court meant to sug-
gest that Fourteenth Amendment standards provide a proper baseline to apply to local ter-
ritorial governance under the Insular Cases because territorial governments are
functionally comparable to states. For critical analysis of these statements, see Laughlin,
Cultural Preservation, supra note 18.
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On the other hand, a balancing approach may make the optional
character of grand jury indictment for federal offenses in federal court in
the USVI difficult to justify. While local tradition might explain the ab-
sence of any provision for grand jury indictments for local territorial of-
fenses prosecuted in local courts, Congress's provision that federal of-
fenses (and certain territorial offenses) may be charged by grand jury
indictment in federal courts in the USVI if the government so chooses
seems to indicate that such indictment would be feasible, at least in fed-
eral court. 0 ' The disuniformity in procedure for federal defendants
charged in the USVI or on the mainland thus seems questionable.os
In sum, while the Insular Cases established a troubled doctrine
rooted in an outdated imperialist logic, this doctrine, as recharacterized
in Boumediene,309 can provide a basis for affording local territorial govern-
ments a procedural flexibility analogous to that enjoyed by states exercis-
ing federally conferred criminal jurisdiction. Though formally distinct
because of the congressional origins of all territorial power under the
Constitution, these situations are functionally parallel: In both contexts,
local procedural autonomy supports allowing limited departures from
constitutional requirements applicable to the federal government that do
not appear systematically significant with respect to trial outcomes or the
fundamental fairness of proceedings. Indeed, consistent with the Ninth
Circuit's tolerance of incomplete jury rights in CNMI,si 0 the greater
autonomy interest of territories to which the United States has made only
an incomplete commitment may justify even greater departures from the
Bill of Rights than have been tolerated for states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. Tribal CriminalJurisdiction. - Tribal courts present the most diffi-
cult context for applying a balancing approach to criminal procedure
rights. Although Congress has extended many constitutional require-
ments to tribal criminal proceedings by statute, the Indian Civil Rights
Act generally does not fully extend the right to appointed counsel, nor
does it ensure that tribal juries include nonmembers of the prosecuting
tribe, even if the defendant is a nonmember (though it does require that
the jury venire include a fair cross-section of the community in any pros-
ecution of non-Indians under the new Oliphant fix).3 1' While the
Supreme Court has deemed such procedural departures permissible in
prosecutions of tribal members, it has done so on the theory that tribal
307. 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (2006).
308. Cf. Joycelyn Hewlett, The Virgin Islands: Grand Jury Denied, 35 How. L.J. 263,
283 (1992) (advocating requirement of grand jury indictments for USVI).
309. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756-58 (2008).
310. See Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.3d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984) (up-
holding limited jury trial rights in CNMI); see also supra notes 152-155 and accompanying
text (discussing limited nature of these rights).
311. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. V 2012); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act
of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904 (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (3)).
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members have consented to tribal court jurisdiction by maintaining en-
rollment in the tribe.312 The Court thus has left open the question of
whether procedural variations from Bill of Rights requirements violate
due process in prosecutions of nonmembers. 13
Lara's holding that tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers
under the Duro fix is inherent for double jeopardy purposes might by
itself answer the due process question.3 14 On this view, since Congress has
characterized the tribal authority exercised under the Duro and Oliphant
fixes as inherent and not delegated, the Constitution is inapplicable in
prosecutions conducted pursuant to these jurisdictional grants. Only
tribal law and congressional enactments determine criminal procedure
rights in tribal courts.31 5
Either of two theories, however, could support the application of
constitutional due process restrictions to tribal prosecutions of non-
members. First, the Court might conclude that tribal authority always has
constitutional dimensions, given the background authorization or acqui-
escence required for its exercise, but constitutional restrictions on its ex-
ercise are suspended in the case of members due to their presumptive
consent to traditional tribal procedures. This view arguably would con-
tradict Talton, in which the Court reasoned that "the existence of the
right in Congress to regulate the manner in which the local powers of
[Indian tribes] shall be exercised does not render such local powers
Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of the
United States.""' But it might also draw support from Duro's sugges-
tion,"' reiterated in one recent civil case, 8 that consent provides the
sole basis for tribal jurisdiction.
312. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
313. The few lower court decisions addressing the issue have avoided resolving it by
disposing of the case on other grounds. See, e.g., Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924,
935 (9th Cir. 2005) (declining to resolve whether due process requires appointment of
counsel in tribal prosecutions because tribe that conducted prosecution afforded right to
appointed counsel).
314. See supra Part I.D (citing Lara as example of how applicability of structural and
procedural requirements of Constitution may turn on distinction between inherent and
delegated authority).
315. For an argument in support of this position, see Eric Wolpin, Note, Answering
Lara's Call: May Congress Place Nonmember Indians Within Tribal Jurisdiction Without
Running Afoul of Equal Protection or Due Process Requirements?, 8 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
1071, 1097 (2006) ("In Lara, the Court made clear that the authority for tribal prosecution
was not federal power, but tribal sovereignty.").
316. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). Scholars also have noted that the
Court's consent-based view of tribal jurisdiction is anomalous because presence within a
sovereign's territory is normally considered sufficient for criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Frickey, Exceptionalism, supra note 6, at 479 ("When I set foot in Alaska, the law presumes
my consent to Alaska's jurisdiction, regardless of the presence or absence of actual con-
sent.").
317. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
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A second, more plausible view would hold that the need for congres-
sional reauthorization of tribal authority over nonmembers following
Duro and Oliphant brings tribal actions pursuant to that authorization
within the ambit of constitutional constraints on federal action. In Duro,
the Court concluded that tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians was inconsistent with explicit or implicit limitations
placed on tribal sovereignty by Congress. Lara recognized Congress's au-
thority to relax those limitations and restore tribal authority, but the
Constitution may limit what criminal procedures Congress can allow
when it restores lapsed criminal jurisdiction of tribal governments. In
other words, when it passes legislation like the Duro and Oliphant fixes,
Congress might be considered responsible for the tribes' exercise of ju-
risdiction to a degree that it was not when the tribe originally exercised
that power, before the implicit divestiture detected by the Court in Duro
and Oliphant.
Such a doctrinal conclusion, however controversial among scholars
and advocates of tribal sovereignty,319 would appear more consistent with
the concerns about extraconstitutional authority animating the Court's
recent cases than would a theory deeming such tribal prosecution consti-
tutionally unregulated under Talton. Realistically, even Lara's double
jeopardy holding appears fragile. Two members of the Lara Court's 5-4
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, have since left
the Court. Moreover, by leaving open the due process question, the
Court has left room for the embrace of a version of the position es-
poused by Justice Kennedy in his Lara concurrence-that the Due
Process Clause, and perhaps also structural guarantees of the
Constitution, preclude any conferral of criminal jurisdiction over non-
members on "a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the
Constitution."" A recent civil decision seems to point in that direction.
In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., the Court, per
Chief Justice Roberts, suggested that even tribal inherent jurisdiction
over civil disputes required "commensurate consent" on the part of the
defendant, in part because "[t]he Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian
318. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337
(2008) (requiring "commensurate consent" for tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember).
319. Some have argued that requiring native communities to respect individual rights
in any form may involve imposition of an alien, individualistic Western culture. See, e.g.,
Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the
Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 235, 278 (1997) (arguing American legal system, unlike tribal culture, is based upon
individualistic principles). The case for requiring protections for individual rights would
seem to be at its strongest, however, when a tribe seeks to impose criminal penalties on a
nonmember. For a nuanced discussion of these issues, see Goldberg, Tribal Revitalization,
supra note 262 (addressing numerous viewpoints on injection of Anglo-American "individ-
ualistic" law into Indian tribal proceedings and discussing potential issues that may arise
and how they would affect tribal revitalization efforts).
320. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
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tribes." 32 For proponents of tribal sovereignty, therefore, it is worth con-
sidering whether drawing the Court away from the inherent authority
framework and toward a more pragmatic approach may be critical to up-
holding tribal jurisdiction.
As this Article has argued, even when state courts exercise federally
conferred jurisdiction, a balancing test may explain which guarantees of
the U.S. Constitution apply.322 At the same time, while territorial courts
exercise only federally delegated power, the Constitution applies incom-
pletely to their proceedings, and, as this Article has argued, a balancing
standard may govern the application of criminal procedure rights there
as well.323 Moreover, in the tribal context, not only did Lara hold open
the possibility that tribal-inherent jurisdiction may be subject to due pro-
cess limitations, but Talton itself indicated that some unspecified category
of "general provisions of the Constitution of the United States" may apply
to tribal government action.324
To the extent that courts accept this analysis, the state and, espe-
cially, territorial precedents discussed above may provide a model for
balancing these competing interests in the tribal context. Here, too, au-
tonomy interests of the tribe might support allowing prosecution in ac-
cordance with traditional procedures of the particular prosecuting tribe,
but only insofar as the accommodation of the tribe's procedural tradition
does not unduly burden the individual interests underlying an asserted
procedural right. Moreover, here too, courts might assess the effect on
individual rights by seeking in particular to avoid procedural discrepan-
cies that appear likely to have systematic effects on trial outcomes or the
fundamental fairness of proceedings.
In fact, some lower courts already use a version of this test in apply-
ing the due process protections extended to tribal courts by statute un-
der the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Ninth Circuit, for example, held that
"[w] here the tribal court procedures under scrutiny differ significantly
from those commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon society, courts weigh the
individual right to fair treatment against the magnitude of the tribal in-
terest in employing those procedures to determine whether the proce-
dures pass muster under [ICRA's due process provisions]."321 Similarly,
tribal courts, which, because of the limitations on federal court review
321. 554 U.S. at 337.
322. See supra Part II.C.1.
323. See supra Part II.C.2.
324. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); see also Eric Cheyfitz, The Colonial
Double Bind: Sovereignty and Civil Rights in Indian Country, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 223,
225-26 (2003) (questioning what provisions could be "if not, in significant part, a guaran-
tee of certain individual civil rights").
325. Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988) (altera-
tions omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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are the principal interpreters of the statute,326 have understood ICRA to
afford tribes flexibility to accommodate local traditions and practices,
while nonetheless meaningfully constraining governmental action.327
Analogous forms of balancing might be appropriate as a constitutional
matter in balancing the interests at stake in tribal criminal prosecutions
of nonmembers.
Although a full examination of the variety of criminal procedures
applied in tribal courts is beyond the scope of this Article,328 this
standard would likely preserve space for at least some distinctive tribal
procedures, while also constraining some widespread practices. Just as in
the state and territorial contexts, there would seem to be no compelling
reason to require grand jury indictment in tribal courts (as Talton
squarely held329 ). There also seem to be grounds to allow substantial
variation from federal jury practice, provided resulting procedures
remain systematically fair; at a minimum, allowing tribes the same
flexibility as states with respect to jury size and verdict unanimity seems
appropriate. Rights of confrontation might also be an area where some
flexibility with respect to doctrinal particulars should be permissible, at
least insofar as tribes' historical traditions depart significantly from the
Anglo-American historical practices on which the Court has based its
recent holdings that all "testimonial" evidence is admissible only if
subject to full cross-examination.330 There might similarly be room to
326. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing limited federal court re-
view of tribal court decisions).
327. See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Tribal Courts and The Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 479, 487-88
(2000) (noting while "[t]ribal courts have the authority to construe ICRA provisions in
light of tribal needs, values, customs, and traditions," this "does not mean that tribal gov-
ernments can do whatever they please within Indian country").
328. For a general discussion of tribal criminal procedures, see, e.g., Carrie E.
Garrow & Sarah Deer, Tribal Criminal Law and Procedure 201-352 (2004). For surveys of
tribal court ICRA rulings, see Austin, supra note 262, at 124-31 (discussing Navajo court
decisions on criminal procedure rights); McCarthy, supra note 75, at 467-68 (1998)
(discussing sample of cases from thirty-year period); Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court
Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 285,
290-91 (1997) (discussing sample of eighty-five tribal court decisions); Rosen, Evaluating,
supra note 75 (surveying published tribal court opinions from thirteen-year period);
Christian M. Freitag, Note, Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court Disposition of Due
Process, 72 Ind. L.J. 831, 832-33 (1997) (surveying due process cases across tribes). For
arguments that at least some tribal courts are fundamentally fair to nonmembers, see, e.g.,
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal
Legal Systems, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1047, 1094 (2005) (discussing Navajo courts). But see
Rosen, Evaluating, supra note 75, at 319-23 (noting issue as one of potential concern).
329. 163 U.S. at 384.
330. Compare Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009) (apply-
ing Confrontation Clause to exclude affidavits by lab analysts), and Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (interpreting Confrontation Clause to exclude "testi-
monial" evidence), with Colville Confederated Tribes v. Marchand, 33 I.L.R. 6036
(Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation Tribal Ct. 2006) (declining for this reason to
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adapt Fourth Amendment standards to account for culturally specific
notions of what searches and seizures are reasonable.33 1
On the other hand, exclusion of nonmembers from jury service in
prosecutions under the Duro fix would seem to pose difficult questions of
fundamental fairness. In federal and state court, jury representativeness
is ensured by the Sixth Amendment's "fair cross section" requirement,
which precludes systematic exclusion of any "distinctive" group in the
community from the jury venire. 32 Representativeness is also guaranteed
by equal protection limitations on the government's opportunity to ex-
clude members of the defendant's race from the jury through peremp-
tory strikes.333 Except in domestic violence prosecutions of non-Indians
under the new Oliphant fix, however, ICRA does not incorporate the
Sixth Amendment language requiring an "impartial jury" on which the
fair cross section requirement is based. 34 Some tribal courts appear to
have deemed requirements relating to jury representativeness inapplica-
ble to their juries, in part because of questions regarding tribes' authority
to compel nonmembers' attendance as jurors.3" But while some accom-
modation of tribal circumstances may be appropriate with respect to pre-
cise doctrinal requirements of the fair cross section rule, complete ab-
sence of nonmembers from juries in prosecutions of nonmembers raises
serious concerns of systematic bias that should be constitutionally regu-
lated.3 16
Similarly, the practice of allowing incarceration for up to a year
without affording appointed counsel might appear difficult to sustain,
given the fundamental importance of the assistance of counsel in ensur-
ing fairness in proceedings of any complexity. Some tribal courts appear
to have adopted alternative procedural protections in an effort to ensure
automatically adopt Crawford).
331. See, e.g., Goldberg, Tribal Revitalization, supra note 262, at 914-15 (discussing
Hopi decision treating police stop based on family members' concern about elder's ab-
sence as permissible "welfare check" rather than unlawful search and seizure).
332. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (confirming fair cross sec-
tion is required by "impartial jury" guarantee); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64
(1979) (describing elements of fair cross section violation).
333. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986) (holding prosecutor's actions
at voir dire can raise inference of impermissible discriminatory use of preemptory strikes),
modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
334. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006).
335. See Rosen, Evaluating, supra note 75, at 320 (arguing decisions excluding non-
members from juries were necessary and reasonable).
336. Cf. Washburn, American Indians, supra note 221, at 747-64 (discussing constitu-
tional concerns with underrepresentation of Native Americans on federal juries trying
Indian country cases). In practice, some tribes include nonmembers on juries. See, e.g.,
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878, 892 (8th Cir.
2007) (noting party's failure to exercise opportunity under tribal code to request sum-
moning of non-Indians to serve on jury), rev'd on other grounds, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
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fairness for defendants not represented by counsel,337 but it is questiona-
ble whether any such substitute protections can prevent systematic out-
come effects.m3 1
Consistent with the framework proposed above with respect to the
necessity of federal executive control and double jeopardy, an approach
that applies constitutional requirements while seeking accommodation
of tribal practices would make it unnecessary to analyze whether tribal
authority is inherent or delegated. Instead, insofar as tribal criminal ju-
risdiction over offenses against tribal law is permissible, a balancing
framework should govern the applicability of particular procedural rights
in any particular tribe's courts. This approach would harmonize federal
Indian law with related state and territorial contexts, preserving tribal
distinctiveness while also preserving fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees. In doing so, it might lend support to the permissibility of tribal ju-
risdiction in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Structural and procedural constitutional questions presented by
tribal and territorial criminal jurisdiction, this Article has argued,
amount to problems of dividing sovereignty--of deciding whether gov-
ernmental actions should be treated as local or federal for constitutional
purposes. That is so because tribal or territorial prosecution always de-
pends on governmental decisions at two separate levels of government.
On the one hand, the longstanding judicial gloss on the Constitution's
sparse text on tribes and territories supports allowing these communities
substantial self-governance, and in practice local tribal and territorial
governments decide for themselves whether to prosecute particular cases
within their jurisdiction. On the other hand, under the entrenched doc-
trine of federal plenary power over tribes and territories, the federal gov-
ernment always bears some constitutional responsibility for the actions of
tribal and territorial governments, if only because Congress could have
chosen to bar the jurisdiction exercised by tribal or territorial authorities.
This Article has attempted to show that viewing the issues in these
terms, and recognizing the important parallels among tribal, territorial,
and certain federal-state contexts, may clarify the analysis of three central
questions that have arisen as a result of the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions in these areas. First, the divided sovereignty framework supports
allowing tribal and territorial authorities to continue to enforce tribal
337. See Rosen, Evaluating, supra note 75, at 311-12 (discussing claims of waived
right to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel in tribal courts).
338. For an argument against requiring appointed counsel in tribal court, see
Vincent C. Milani, Note, The Right to Counsel in Native American Tribal Courts: Tribal
Sovereignty and Congressional Control, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1279, 1291-99 (1994) (argu-




and territorial criminal laws without direct federal supervision. Second,
the framework supports allowing both tribal and territorial governments
to prosecute offenders without regard to whether the federal govern-
ment has also punished those offenders for the same offense. And finally,
the framework supports allowing limited accommodation of tribal and
territorial procedures that depart from Bill of Rights requirements in
federal or state court.
The framework may well have other applications. For instance, it
may shed light on related questions in the civil context. But the analysis
presented here also shows how considering tribal and territorial contexts
may illuminate constitutional questions in the more familiar federal-state
setting. For example, as this Article has shown, the longstanding ac-
ceptance of tribal and territorial self-governance powerfully reinforces
the view that receiving authority from a federal statute is not enough, by
itself, to make someone an "Officer of the United States" who must be
appointed by the President or other senior federal officials under the
Appointments Clause. Similarly, tribal and territorial examples help to
highlight what is at stake in the Supreme Court's "separate sovereigns"
approach to double jeopardy questions. Those examples may also under-
score the significance for communal autonomy of the homogenization of
criminal procedure accomplished at the federal and state levels by the
Supreme Court's turn toward complete incorporation of the Bill of
Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment. More broadly, considering tribal
and territorial communities and their unique claims to autonomous self-
governance may help sharpen our perspective on the basic problem of
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